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MEANINGLESS COMPARISONS: CORPORATE
TAX REFORM DISCOURSE IN THE UNITED
STATES
*

Omri Y. Marian

“To say simply that we want to adopt certain territorial features and
low statutory rates offered by other countries’ tax systems is somewhat
like going out to shop for a car and saying, I would like to have a
1
Corvette engine without worrying about anything else.”
This article examines the role that international comparisons play
in current corporate tax reform discourse in the United States. Citing
the need to make the U.S. corporate tax system more competitive,
comparisons are frequently used to assess other jurisdictions’ taxcompetitiveness, and many legislative proposals are supported by such
comparative arguments. Examining such discourse against the
background of several theoretical approaches to comparative law, this
article argues that, to the extent that comparisons are aimed at
providing guidance for prospective reform, this purpose is not well
served. Participants in the corporate tax reform discourse, from both
sides of the aisle, lack any comparative methodological discipline. They
execute comparisons in an incoherent way, often ignoring important
differences between the United States and the jurisdictions it is
compared to. The result is proposals that are based on misperceptions
of the way that corporate tax laws operate in the compared
*

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law. For
helpful guidance, comments and critique I am indebted to Reuven Avi-Yonah,
participants in the 15th Annual Critical Tax Conference held at Seton Hall Law
School in March 2012, and participants in the Law and Society Annual Conference
held in Hawai’i in June 2012. Any errors or omissions are my own.
1
How Other Countries Have Used Tax Reform to Help Their Companies
Compete in the Global Market and Create Jobs: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Ways and Means, 112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter Ways and Means May 24 Hearing]
(statement of Rep. Sander M. Levin, Ranking Member, H. Comm. on Ways and
Means).
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jurisdictions. The article further suggests that a coherent methodology,
if explicitly harnessed to promote a well-defined agenda, could make
international comparison a constructive instrument of tax
policymaking.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“U.S. companies face a high tax burden as compared to their
2
foreign-based competitors.” In fact, they face the second-highest (!)
3
effective tax rate in the world. Also, it is a fact that “United States
corporations pay only slightly more on average than their
4
counterparts in other industrial countries.” Wait! What? Didn’t you
just say that . . .? Yes, I did. But wait! There is more. Some indicators
imply that U.S. corporations face a tax burden that is “the second
5
lowest among . . . leading industrialized nations.”
Confusing, isn’t it? Arguably, U.S. corporations either pay more,
the same, or less tax in comparison to corporations in other countries,
and these three options are mutually exclusive. So which is it? The
second highest or the second lowest?
Of course, there may well be a very simple explanation for this
apparent inconsistency. As one well-known TV ad puts it: “90 percent
of all statistics can be made to say anything . . . 50 percent of the

2

Amy S. Elliott, Large U.S. Firms’ Effective Tax Rates Surpass OECD Average,
Survey Says, 2011 TNT 73-3 (Apr. 15, 2011); see also Kevin A. Hassett & Aparna
Mathur, Report Card on Effective Corporate Tax Rates: United States Gets an F,
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH (Feb. 9, 2011),
http://www.aei.org/print/report-card-on-effective-corporate-tax-rates.
3
Elliott, supra note 2 (citing Kevin S. Markle & Douglas A. Shackelford,
Cross-Country Comparisons of Corporate Income Taxes (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 16839, 2011)).
4
David Kocieniewski, U.S. Business Has High Tax Rates but Pays Less, N.Y.
TIMES (May 2, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/03/business/economy/
03rates.html.
5
Chuck Marr & Brian Highsmith, Six Tests for Corporate Tax Reform, CTR. ON
BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, 3 (Feb. 28, 2011), http://www.cbpp.org/files/2-2811tax.pdf; See also U.S. Is One of the Least Taxed Developed Countries, CITIZENS FOR
TAX JUSTICE (June 30, 2011, 01:41 PM), http://ctj.org/ctjreports/2011/06/
us_one_of_the_least_taxed_developed_countries.php.
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6

time.” Corporate taxation is a highly politicized issue, and the results
of cross-jurisdictional corporate tax burden comparisons may depend
on the agenda that the comparative researcher intends to serve. Even
if a researcher is not “serving an agenda” per se, corporate tax
burdens can be calculated in many different ways and the choice of
which methodology is used carries with it certain assumptions, some
of which may stem from the researcher’s political and ideological
beliefs.
But there is another explanation for this phenomenon – one that
is not as simple but carries much more significance – and this
explanation is the focal point of this article. This article argues that,
within the vibrant political debate on possible corporate tax reform in
the United States, international legal comparisons are usually so
poorly executed by the participants in this discourse, that it is doubtful
the comparisons serve a truly useful purpose. The resulting misuse of
the comparative methodology enables contradicting arguments to
flourish (where presumably there should be one correct answer) and
produces legislative proposals that are based on misperceptions of the
operation of legal tax models.
Some background is helpful. Recently, corporate tax reform
7
discourse has taken center stage. This discourse has a very important
and unique characteristic: It is predominantly a comparative legal
discourse. Participants in the discourse, whether they are elected
officials, nonprofit organizations, lobbying groups, the media, tax
practitioners, or the academic community (I refer to all members of
these groups as “participants” throughout this article), frequently set
their arguments in a comparative posture. To a significant extent, the
international competitiveness of U.S. multinational corporations
8
(MNCs) dictates the agenda. Significantly, arguments about
6

sigler1776, Statistics Direct TV Commercial2, YOUTUBE (Feb. 29, 2012),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q2loC03Vh6Q.
7
Tax reform in the United States, with particular emphasis on corporate tax
reform, is always on someone’s agenda. For a historical survey of corporate tax
reform proposals in the U.S., see Steven A. Bank, The Rise and Fall of Post-World
War II Corporate Tax Reform, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2010, at 207
[hereinafter Bank, The Rise and Fall].
8
To name a few examples from different kinds of participants in the discourse,
see Nat’l Comm’n on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, The Moment of Truth: Report
of the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, USA TODAY, 24
(Dec. 2010), http://www.usatoday.com/news/_photos/2010/12/01/TheMomentofTruth.
pdf [hereinafter The Moment of Truth] (noting that “[t]he corporate income tax . . .
hurts America’s ability to compete”); Hearing on The Need for Comprehensive Tax
Reform to Help American Companies Compete in the Global Market and Create Jobs

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2037295

MARIAN.FINAL.DOC

2012]

10/23/2012 5:34 PM

Meaningless Comparisons

137

international competitiveness are, by definition, comparative
arguments. They imply that someone else is trying to achieve the same
goals as U.S. MNCs, and may be better (or worse) at it. And indeed,
at times, this discourse is even defined by its participants as a
comparative discourse. The House Committee on Ways and Means
(Ways and Means Committee) and the Senate Finance Committee
(Finance Committee) have each specifically dedicated time in recent
9
hearings on tax reform to comparative tax law.
This comparative political discourse provides a unique
opportunity to assess how comparative law is used as an instrument in
advancing real-life legal reforms in the United States, specifically in
the context of the making of tax laws. This article finds, however, that
if the purpose of comparing the U.S. corporate tax system with those
of other nations is to somehow advance successful corporate tax
reform in the United States, this purpose is not well served. Even
worse, such comparisons – in the way they are currently executed –
may create misperceptions about what legal changes have taken place
elsewhere, why they were pursued, whether they were successful, and
whether all of this is at all relevant to a U.S. corporate tax reform. The
worst-case outcome could be corporate tax legislation that simply will
not bring about the hoped-for results because it is based on a
fundamental misunderstanding of comparisons to other jurisdictions. I
have previously argued that scholarship in comparative tax law is
10
flawed for lacking any coherent theoretical background. This article
complements that theoretical stance by demonstrating how that lack
of theoretical discipline negatively affects actual tax policymaking.

for American Workers: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Ways and Means, 112th
Cong. 11 (2011) [hereinafter Ways and Means May 12 Hearing]; Peter R. Merrill,
Competitive Tax Rates for U.S. Companies: How Low to Go?, 122 TAX NOTES 1009
(Feb. 23, 2009); Scott A. Hodge & Andre Dammert, U.S. Lags While Competitors
Accelerate Corporate Income Tax Reform: Fiscal Fact No. 184, TAX FOUNDATION
(Aug. 2009), http://taxfoundation.org/sites/ taxfoundation.org/files/docs/ff184.pdf;
Michael S. Knoll, The Corporate Income Tax and the Competitiveness of U.S.
Industries, 63 TAX L. REV. 771 (2010).
9
See, e.g., Ways and Means May 24 Hearing, supra note 1, at 25; Best Practices
in Tax Administration: A Look Across the Globe: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Fin. 112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter Finance April 12 Hearing] (testimony of Brian
Erard, B.E. & Associates); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-867T,
VALUE-ADDED TAXES: POTENTIAL LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES FROM OTHER
COUNTRIES’ EXPERIENCES (2011) (statement of James R. White, Dir. Strategic Issues,
to H. Ways and Means Comm.).
10
See Omri Y. Marian, The Discursive Failure in Comparative Tax Law, 58 AM.
J. COMP. L. 415 (2010).
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The article is structured as follows: Part I sets out the theoretical
background to be used in assessing any comparative tax reform
discourse. It presents several competing approaches that legal
comparativists might exercise when harnessing cross-jurisdictional
comparisons for the benefit of tax reform. Part II briefly describes the
conditions that produced the current debate on corporate tax reform
in the United States and notes some major initiatives taken in this
respect. Part III demonstrates the central role that comparative law
plays in this debate and refines and explains some (but not all) of the
comparative arguments most commonly made in respect of possible
corporate tax reform. Part IV examines these comparative arguments
in the context of the theories presented in Part I. It demonstrates how
many participants in the discourse failed to follow any coherent
methodology in their comparisons (regardless of the participants’
political stance) and how, as a result, their comparative arguments are
frequently questionable. When analyzing these failures, Part IV will
also point to possible remedies. The argument here is that the wheel
of comparative tax discourse does not need to be reinvented. It simply
needs to be used correctly. Finally, I conclude that such a failure is not
only a technical one. It also stems from the fact that the participants
wrongly perceive the comparative process to be an objective one
rather than a legitimate (and useful) instrument for advancing
political agendas.
It is important to note at the outset that the purpose of this article
is not to take a stand in the tax reform debate. It does not suggest
paths to corporate tax reform. Rather, the article is posed to answer
the question of what role does comparative law play in corporate tax
reform discourse in the United States. To the extent that such a role is
viewed negatively, the article explains how the process of comparison
should be executed so as to improve its utility in this debate.
II. THEORIES OF COMPARATIVE LAW AS A MECHANISM OF TAX
REFORM
A. Competing Approaches to the Use of Comparisons in the Tax
Reform Process
In what way should we approach comparison if the purpose is to
use comparison as an instrument to advance tax reform? Generally,
the spectrum of answers can be divided into two main approaches.
Both approaches have many offshoots and sub-schools of thinking,
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11

but, for purposes of this article, I shall only discuss the two ends.
The first approach adheres to the comparisons and identification
of similarities and is commonly referred to as the functional approach.
Functional legal comparativists operate under the assumption that
“the legal system of every society faces essentially the same problems,
and solves these problems by quite different means, though very often
12
with similar results.” Comparative legal functionalism is evident in
the writings of several tax scholars (some more explicitly than others).
Such commentators repeatedly point to the remarkable degree of
similarity in the tax laws of different jurisdictions, which have started
13
quite far apart. A comparative tax functionalist would typically see
convergence of tax laws not only as an easily observed phenomenon
but also as a desirable process from a normative perspective. Thus,
within the context of tax reform, the borrowing of legal models of
taxation and their transplantation in the systems that undergo reform
14
is desirable.
Of course, when a comparative study is aimed at adopting legal
models from other jurisdictions, a question of benchmarking is
inherent. We do not want to simply adopt any tax model; we want to
adopt the most successful tax model. Economic analysis plays an
15
important part here. For example, if the purpose of our reform is to
improve the efficiency of the tax system, our comparative analysis will
“begin the comparison from a ‘neutral scale’ that can be validated by

11

For more detailed surveys of schools of thought in comparative taxation see
REUVEN AVI-YONAH, NICOLA SARTORI & OMRI MARIAN, GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON
INCOME TAXATION LAW 1-16 (2011); Marian, supra note 10.
12
KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN K•TZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE
LAW, 34 (Tony Weir trans., Oxford Univ. Press 3d rev. ed. 1998) (1977).
13
See, e.g., Carlo Garbarino, An Evolutionary Approach to Comparative
Taxation: Methods and Agenda for Research, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 677 (2009); REUVEN
AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME 1-21 (2007); Victor Thuronyi, What Can We Learn
From Comparative Tax Law?, 103 TAX NOTES 459, 460–461 (Apr. 26, 2004); Yariv
Brauner, An International Tax Regime in Crystallization, 56 Tax L. Rev. 259 (2003).
14
See, e.g., Carlo Garbarino, Comparative Taxation and Legal Theory: The Tax
Design Case of the Transplant of General Anti-Avoidance Rules, 11 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 765 (2010) (suggesting a framework for successful legal borrowing of
anti-tax-avoidance rules).
15
This form of analysis is sometimes described as a separate school of thought,
namely Comparative Law and Economics. See, e.g., UGO MATTEI, COMPARATIVE
LAW AND ECONOMICS (1997); Raffaele Caterina, Comparative Law and Economics,
in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 161 (Jan M. Smits ed., 2006).
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16

observable data: economic efficiency.” In essence, such a study is
aimed at comparative inquiries into the deviations of different
jurisdictions from an economically efficient benchmark: a so-called
17
model legal institution or legal system.
The second research approach concentrates its efforts in
identifying and explaining differences and is commonly associated
with the cultural approach to comparative law. Cultural comparativists
reject the functional assumption of similarities of social problems and
legal solutions. Rather, cultural comparativists assume that law is part
of a broader cultural phenomenon. Each culture contains elements
such as values, traditions, and beliefs that give each culture its
uniqueness. According to such an approach, this differentiation of
“legal cultures” entails that the laws (which are embedded in these
18
cultures) are also necessarily different. Under the cultural approach,
convergence of law is not only improbable but it is also probably
undesirable because difference among jurisdictions “satisfies the need
19
for self-transcendence.”
Differences also guide the critical approach to comparative law.
Critical studies in comparative law are aimed at exposing the
pretended apolitical nature of so-called mainstream comparative law
and to suggest alternative discursive agendas. According to this view,
comparative legal studies should be a liberating project, releasing us
from the cognitive cage of abstract relativist dichotomies (such as
common law/civil law, Western/Oriental, self/other), which are

16

Oliver Brand, Conceptual Comparisons: Towards a Coherent Methodology of
Comparative Legal Studies, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 405, 421 (2007).
17
Of course, it is not necessary that an economic benchmark will be that of
efficiency. For example, if we seek tax reform for the purpose of making taxation
more fair in terms of having the tax burden shared among taxpayers in an equitable
manner (assuming we know what “equitable” means), we would start with a wellaccepted benchmark of income measurement (such as the Haig-Simons model) and
see how other countries deviated from such a model to effect the desired economic
redistribution. See William B. Barker, Expanding the Study of Comparative Tax Law
to Promote Democratic Policy: The Example of the Move to Capital Gains Taxation in
Post-Apartheid South Africa, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 703 (2005); William B. Barker, A
Comparative Approach to Income Tax Law in the United Kingdom and the United
States, 46 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 7 (1996).
18
See Roger Cotterrell, Comparative Law and Legal Culture, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 709 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmerman
eds., 2008).
19
Pierre Legrand, The Same and the Different, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL
STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS 240, 280 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick
Munday eds., 2003).
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20

wrongly perceived to be objective.
In the context of difference-oriented approaches, legal borrowing
is hardly an obvious exercise of legal reform. Any borrowed models
must undergo a modification, at times a significant one, which is
intended to ensure the acceptance of the borrowed model in its new
21
local environment. Such alteration may be heavily influenced by
local considerations, and the ultimate outcome may be completely
different from the original rule.
Between the two ends of the spectrum described above, opinions
regarding the comparative process will differ as to the extent that local
considerations need to be taken into account.
For example, the functional approach will tend to view a legal
model widely adopted by many jurisdictions as a successful model.
The fact that many jurisdictions adopted such a model validates its
effectiveness. Regarding tax reform, such an approach is evident in
the calls to adopt a VAT or reduce corporate tax rates. These calls are
based on the experiences of many other jurisdictions. On the other
hand, comparative cultural approaches to reform will be more
skeptical of such models, and such skepticism will show itself on two
different levels. First, cultural comparative reformers may question
that the model adopted in so many jurisdictions is indeed the same
model. It is possible that local social, political, and cultural
considerations have affected the model differently in each jurisdiction
so that this “same” model is actually many different models. This
means that we are looking at not just one possible model to adopt in
our home jurisdiction. VAT may mean different things in different
jurisdictions. We still need to understand which of these models is the
correct one for our purpose because “[t]here is a pronounced
tendency for the tax argument to become an argument about
something else; but what that ‘something else’ is, and how it impacts
22
the tax process, differs substantially between different countries.”

20

Günter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26
HARV. INT’L L.J. 411, 444–45 (1985).
21
In the tax context, see, e.g., Assaf Likhovski, Is Tax Law Culturally Specific?
Lessons from the History of Income Tax Law in Mandatory Palestine, 11
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 725 (2010) (explaining how British income tax law was
transplanted in Mandate Palestine and the modification it went through on account of
local considerations); Anthony C. Infanti, The Ethics of Tax Cloning, 6 FLA. TAX
REV. 251, 336–37 (2003).
22
Michael A. Livingston, From Milan to Mumbai, Changing in Tel Aviv:
Reflections on Progressive Taxation and “Progressive” Politics in a Globalized but Still
Local World, 54 AM J. COMP. L. 555, 582 (2006); see also, Michael A. Livingston,
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On the second level, cultural comparativists will question the
argument that we should adopt a model because it succeeded
elsewhere. Success in another jurisdiction is not necessarily a good
indicator for its success in our home jurisdiction. Contextual
differences may dictate different results.
B. Processes of Tax Law Comparisons
To be useful, the insights gleaned from the process of comparison
must be at least materially accurate and workable. If we intend to
implement legal models from a foreign jurisdiction into our local
system, we need to first make sure that we understand how these
models work in the other jurisdiction. We then need to assess
whether, given the tension between local and global contexts, these
models are at all appropriate for application in our system. If they are
not, we need to consider whether modifications can be made that will
make the models workable for our system, while making sure that
such changes will not drastically alter the manner in which such
23
models work (assuming this is at all an achievable goal).
One of the main difficulties here is that legal comparativists, while
fiercely debating what approaches should be deemed appropriate for
the comparative study of law, have failed to produce any coherent
24
methodology for the process of legal comparison. This debate does
provide, however, insights as to what such a process should include
and what considerations should be taken into account in each stage of
the process. The process of tax comparison is not dealt with here at
25
length, and only the key points are summarized.
1.

Defining Purposes

To start, we should carefully consider the purpose of comparison.
As previously noted, it is frequently argued that the purpose of
current tax reform contemplated in the United States is to create a
26
corporate tax system that is more “competitive.” Thus, a functional
From Mumbai to Shanghai, with a Side Trip to Washington: China, India, and the
Future of Progressive Taxation in an Asian-Led World, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L.
539, 546–549 (2010) (discussing the tension between universal and local tax concepts).
23
Infanti, supra note 21.
24
See, e.g., Mathias Reimann, The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in
the Second Half of the Twentieth Century, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 671 (2002).
25
I have explained elsewhere in detail the possible approaches to the process of
tax comparison. Marian, supra note 11, at 436–60.
26
Other goals cited are “simplicity” and “fairness.” The goals of current reform
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analysis can be successful only if our comparison includes models that
are aimed at the same result of creating “competitive” tax systems. A
cultural approach will force us to question whether the term
“competitiveness” means the same thing in the compared jurisdiction
and to make sure that the model we refer to as a “competitive” model
will work in the same way if we were to import it into our own
jurisdiction. Defining a purpose for the reform necessarily limits the
models available for comparison.
Once the purpose has been determined, we must design a
comparative process that will serve such a purpose. This process needs
to include, first, a selection of jurisdictions to be compared; second, the
selection of laws to be compared; and, third, a methodology of
27
comparison. I address each in order.
2.

Jurisdictional Selection

Because functionalists operate under the assumption of
similarities, the implication is that the target system should be
compared with “comparably similar” jurisdictions. This means
28
comparing jurisdictions that are at “the same evolutionary stage,”
share similar values, and are thus likely to face similar social
problems. Assuming that a tax comparativist adopts such an approach,
classification to legal families can provide a useful starting point since
classification provides us with a preapproved list of comparable
jurisdictions. In the tax context, Victor Thuronyi pioneered the
taxonomy of legal “tax families.” Thuronyi suggests that we compare
jurisdictions that are “representatives” of a larger tax family or
29
tradition.

debate are further discussed below. See infra Part 0.
27
For comparativists that follow these general guidelines, see, for example,
ZWEIGERT & K•TZ, supra note 12, at 32–47; W. J. Kamba, Comparative Law: A
Theoretical Framework, 23 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 485, 511–12 (1974); Esin Örücü,
Developing Comparative Law, in COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK 43, 47–53
(David Nelken & Esin Örücü eds., 2007); Esin Örücü, Methodology of Comparative
Law, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 15, at 442, 447–49.
28
M. Schmitthoff, The Science of Comparative Law, 7 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 94, 96
(1939).
29
Thuronyi proposes Germany, France, the United States, and the United
Kingdom as natural choices for tax comparison. 2 INT’L MONETARY FUND, TAX LAW
DESIGN AND DRAFTING xxiii–xxxv (Victor Thuronyi ed., 1996); See also VICTOR
THURONYI, COMPARATIVE TAX LAW 23–44 (2003). According to Thuronyi, these
countries can be regarded as “leaders in influencing the tax laws of other countries.”
THURONYI, supra at 9.
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On the other hand, cultural tax comparativists will be somewhat
more flexible in their jurisdictional selection. The comparison of
different “legal cultures” is specifically useful when comparing
jurisdictions that are different in their social and cultural backgrounds,
thus exposing themes of taxation that are affected by local
considerations even amid globalization. It is also helpful to examine
arguably “similar” jurisdictions, particularly to show that any
similarity might be a superficial one and that the underlying cultural
traditions, which are by definition different, significantly affect the
execution of such so-called similar policy choices even when the
jurisdictions being compared face similar problems. In the tax context,
30
such an approach is evident in the writings of Michael Livingston.
3.

Selection of Legal Models

In terms of the laws to be compared, functional analysis calls for
the comparison of tax laws and institutions that essentially fulfill the
same social functions. In this context, we must avoid the trap of
abstractness. The fact that different laws carry the same name (for
example “corporate tax”) does not necessarily mean that both fulfill
the same function. We must make sure that the legal models being
compared function to address the same social need.
Assessing the breadth of the laws to be compared is also
important. On one end of the spectrum, tax laws can be compared in a
“macroscopic sense, [referring] to broad beliefs and practices and
31
their impact upon the contemporary tax system.” On the other end
of the spectrum, comparison is narrower in focus, concentrating on a
32
particular area of law. Both ends of the spectrum are undesirable.
“[C]omparisons must be versatile enough to shift between the micro
and macro level. . . . If not, comparisons risk falling into overgeneralization on the one hand . . . and extra-contextual specificity on
33
the other. . . .”
This is an issue of particular importance in the area of tax law.
Tax law is a notoriously complicated area of law showing “remarkable
variations [as regards] the interactions between statutes,
administrative guidelines, case law and opinions of scholars,” even
30

Livingston, From Milan to Mumbai, Changing in Tel Aviv, supra note 22.
Michael A. Livingston, Law, Culture, and Anthropology: On the Hopes and
Limits of Comparative Tax, 18 Can. J. L. & Jurisprudence 119, 122 (2005).
32
Id. at 122–23.
33
Hiram E. Chodosh, Comparing Comparisons: In Search of Methodology, 84
IOWA L. REV. 1025, 1111 (1999).
31

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2037295

MARIAN.FINAL.DOC

2012]

10/23/2012 5:34 PM

Meaningless Comparisons

145

34

when common tax models are adopted. If we seek to adopt a specific
tax model, such a model must be compared with other models in the
context of some larger picture. For example, one must not only look
at how corporate distributions are taxed, but must understand the
function of taxing distributions within the system of corporate
taxation; one must not only look at “corporate taxation”, but must
also understand its particular function within the general tax system
and its interaction with other parts of this tax system. Finally, we must
understand the broader legal and cultural context in which each tax
system operates. Contrarily, it is easy to fall into over-generalized
comparisons so abstract that they hide the manner in which the tax
model actually works in real life. A tax comparativist should seek to
adopt an intermediate level to compare legal models (or cultures), one
that is narrow enough to be manageable from a practical point of view
but is meaningful enough in terms of explaining or exemplifying the
35
context in which the legal models operate.
4.

The Technique of Comparison

Lastly, the methodology of the comparison itself needs to be
addressed. The functional approach suggests that, once a common
problem has been identified, we need to question the way in which it
is solved in each of the compared jurisdictions (the “problem-solving
approach”). Another possible approach is to take an institutional
view, namely, to ask which institutions in the countries compared
perform the same problem-solving functions best (“the institutional
36
approach”). The answer, in turn, will depend on how we define what
“best” is. If we seek efficiency, economic models may be used to
assess the success of specific legal solutions in advancing efficiency.
From a cultural comparative point of view, the idea is to identify
“tax cultures” and, by doing so, point to real differences in policy
choices. A tax comparativist must assume a priori that tax cultures are
different and that a tax culture does not necessarily correlate with a
37
society’s general culture. This approach suggests that tax cultures are
best understood as a general category from which narrow indicators
can be subsumed and relatively easily compared. Such indicators
might be the education and training of tax elites; the relationship
among lawyers, economists, and other tax professionals; the nature of
34
35
36
37

Garbarino, supra note 13, at 686.
Livingston, supra note 31, at 123.
Örücü, Methodology of Comparative Law, supra note 27, at 443.
See Livingston, supra note 31, at 128–29.
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tax administration; attitudes toward tax compliance and evasion; and
the unwritten traditions that govern the making and implementation
38
of tax policy in the country in question.
III. CURRENT CORPORATE TAX REFORM DEBATE: BACKGROUND
AND PURPOSES
In what follows, I examine the current comparative corporate tax
reform debate, as developed since the current administration took
office. In doing so, I do not advocate (for the most part) the adoption
of one comparative approach over the other. Rather, I follow the path
taken by participants in the discourse. I should note that Parts II and
III are purely descriptive. Readers who are well familiar with the
current political discourse on tax reform, as well as the scholarly
discussions surrounding such discourse, are invited to skip to Section
IV, where I analyze the discourse against the background of the
theories presented in Section I.
I want to start by explaining what I mean by the “current debate.”
As previously noted, corporate tax reform proposals are always “out
there”; however, few “comprehensive” reforms take center stage
employing both tax-writing committees and the White House to the
same significant extent that is apparent since the Obama
administration took power. The last time that such an engagement in
tax reform could be witnessed was between 1984 and 1986, before the
comprehensive Tax Reform Act of 1986 brought about a significant
corporate tax rate reduction coupled with a broadening of the taxable
base.
By November 2008, when then-Senator Barack Obama became
President-Elect Barack Obama, the magnitude of the economic
downturn and its effects on the United States economy had started to
become evident. To a significant extent, the current corporate tax
reform debate is shaped by the 2008 global financial crisis. The crisis
inserted a sense of urgency to the reform talks and also reshaped the
substance of the reform proposals. Even though the financial crisis is
an important factor, it is ill advised to view the crisis as the only major
catalyst of the tax reform debate. Many other factors, both local and
global, played an important role here.
Even before the financial crisis emerged, federal budget deficits
drew much attention. While Republicans and Democrats spend much

38

Livingston, From Milan to Mumbai, Changing in Tel Aviv, supra note 22, at

557.
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energy pointing fingers (Democrats blaming tax cuts from the Bush
administration; Republicans blaming Democrats for excessive
spending), all parties involved seemed to agree that something needed
to be done about the deficit. The economic downturn made things
more complicated. For example, Obama’s pre-election proposal to
“close loopholes” and raise taxes on high-income tax earners lost
39
traction amid financial losses and a disastrous job market.
The deficit problem and the downturn resonated loudly when
combined with another problem frequently noted by many
commentators. Some argue that the corporate tax system in the
United States is “broken” and that it does not fulfill its role in revenue
40
collection. The argument that the U.S. corporate tax system needs
“fixing” can be divided into three sub-arguments. The first argument
is that the corporate tax system in the Unites States fails to keep pace
with the rest of the world. Other countries have taken significant
measures to adjust their corporate tax systems to make them more
competitive in the global market, specifically in terms of statutory rate
cuts. The second argument is that the corporate tax system is riddled
with loopholes and preferences to such an extent that little revenue is
actually collected. The third argument, which, to a great extent, is a
result of the second, is that the corporate tax system is far too
41
complex, making compliance and administration inefficient. In
purposeful terms, the current debate is aimed at creating a corporate
tax system that is more “competitive,” “simple,” and “fair”, and at the
same time addresses the deficit concerns. While this article primarily
addresses the issue of competitiveness, simplicity and fairness should
also be kept in mind. Some or all of these three purposes were
considered by other jurisdictions suffering from deficits as well, and
39

Stephen Utz, Tax Reform in the Aftermath of the Financial Crisis, 35 DAJV
NEWSL. 24, 26–27 (2010).
40
See, e.g., Karen C. Burke, Is the Corporate Tax System “Broken”?, 28 VA. TAX
REV. 341 (2008).
41
A summary of the need for tax reform as perceived by current senior tax
writers follows:
While our major trading partners have spent the last two decades reducing
their corporate tax rates, the U.S. corporate rate is actually higher than it
was 20 years ago. . . . At the same time, the tax code is full of tax
preferences that attempt to pick winners and losers rather than just
allowing the most promising business investments to flourish.
See Press Release, H. Comm. On Ways and Means, Camp Announces Hearing on
How Business Tax Reform Can Encourage Job Creation (May 26, 2011),
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=242048.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2037295

MARIAN.FINAL.DOC

148

10/23/2012 5:34 PM

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. XXXII:133

this fact is of significance.
The factors of global competitive pressures, financial decline, and
an ill-functioning corporate tax system culminated in the current
reform debate. With this background, several major initiatives for a
comprehensive reform have been put forward since President
Obama’s inauguration. In late 2008, less than a month after his
election, President-Elect Obama announced the establishment of the
42
President’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board (PERAB). The aim
of PERAB was “to enhance the strength and competitiveness of the
Nation’s economy and the prosperity of the American people by
ensuring the availability of independent, nonpartisan information,
analysis, and advice to the President as he formulates and implements
43
his plans for economic recovery.” PERAB has been given the
mandate to discuss “the pros and cons of a spectrum of reform ideas
relating to tax simplification, improving compliance with existing tax
44
laws, and reforming the corporate tax system.” PERAB members
were primarily professionals representing various fields of expertise
and business sectors. As such, this task force was charged with
presenting an informative rather than a prescriptive report. PERAB
published its report on tax reform options in August 2010.
The political task of making actual legislative proposals for tax
reform was assigned by the President in February 2010 to the
bipartisan National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform
(named the Bowles-Simpson commission after its co-chairs). The
Bowles-Simpson commission considered, among other items, tax
reform issues for ten months before publishing its report, titled the
45
“Moment of Truth,” in December 2010. The Bowles-Simpson report
reiterated that the proposed tax reform is intended to achieve several
basic goals: reducing rates coupled with broadening the base to
eliminate hidden tax expenditures, reducing the deficit, maintaining
46
progressivity, and improving the competitiveness of U.S. companies.
Starting in late 2010, the two tax-writing committees enlisted
42

Press Release, Office of the President-Elect, President-Elect Barack Obama
Establishes President’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board (Nov. 26, 2008),
http://change.gov/ newsroom/entry/president_elect_barack_obama_establishes_ resi
dents_economic_recovery_advis/.
43
Exec. Order No. 13,501, 74 Fed. Reg. 6983 (Feb. 6, 2009) (emphasis added).
44
Austan Goolsbee, On the PERAB Tax Task Force Report, WHITEHOUSE.GOV
(Aug. 27, 2010, 2:30 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/08/27/perab-tax-taskforce-report.
45
The Moment of Truth, supra note 8.
46
Id. at 26–30.
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themselves for the project of “comprehensive,” or “fundamental,” tax
reform. In September 2010, the Finance Committee, citing
complexity, fairness, and competitiveness as its drivers, started a series
of hearings on possible tax reform. The Ways and Means Committee
joined ranks in January 2011, when it held the “Hearing on
47
Fundamental Tax Reform,” citing “the cost of complexity borne by
American families, the cost of a corporate tax system that is
increasingly out-of-step with the rest of the world, and the broader
cost to the U.S. economy of a tax system that fails to maximize job
48
creation and impedes economic growth.” By August 2011, both
committees had held, in the aggregate, dozens of hearings dedicated
to tax reform. This bipartisan interest in tax reform also induced other
initiatives taking place off the beaten path of the tax-writing
committees, such as the one taken by six senators, three from each
side of the aisle, cooperating in trying to come up with workable
solutions for tax reform legislation. This “Gang of Six” started
meetings in February 2011 and published its budget proposal,
inclusive of a plan for a comprehensive tax reform, in July the same
year, noting competitiveness of the tax system as a key issue that
49
needs addressing.
Regardless of the political divide in terms of substance, the
interest in tax reform in general, and corporate tax reform in
particular, was very high between 2009 and 2011. It is not clear if this
will result in real comprehensive reform, though some commentators
did opine that, notwithstanding the disagreements about the content
of any prospective reform, “corporate tax reform looks like a sure bet,
with broad bipartisan backing, not to mention the support of
50
America’s powerful business community.” Agreement regarding the
purposes of the reform remains elusive, with participants divided on
the relative emphasis on competitiveness versus fairness (though
everyone seems to agree about simplicity). Even so, competitiveness,
47

Fundamental Tax Reform: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means,
112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter Ways and Means Jan. 20 Hearing].
48
Press Release, H. Comm. on Ways and Means, Chairman Camp Announces
First in a Series of Hearings on Fundamental Tax Reform (Jan. 19, 2011),
http://republicans.waysandmeans.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentI
D=220354.
49
Press Release, Gang of Six, A Bipartisan Plan to Reduce our Nation’s Deficits
(July 18, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/r/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/2011/07/
19/ National-Politics/Graphics/Gang_of_Six_Document.pdf.
50
Danielle Kurtzleben, Political Will for Corporate Tax Reform Reaching
Critical Mass, U.S. NEWS (July 28, 2011), www.usnews.com/news/articles/2011/07/28/
political-will-for-corporate-tax-reform-reaching-critical-mass.
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simplicity, and fairness still lead the discussions, and, with these three
purposes in mind, I turn to the analysis of comparative discourse in
current debate.
IV. COMPARATIVE NATURE OF THE DEBATE
A. Competitiveness in General
Of the three purposes of competitiveness, simplicity, and fairness,
to a significant extent, the defining element of current corporate tax
reform debate is competitiveness. Many participants in the debate
constantly argue that the current corporate tax system in the United
51
States is uncompetitive and therefore in need of reform.
Unfortunately, in spite of the heavy reliance on the competitiveness
argument to justify many specific reform proposals, participants in the
discourse have refrained from developing a workable definition of
competitiveness (with very few exceptions). It is sometimes observed
that “it is not countries that are competitive, it is companies that
52
are.” If so, we must determine how corporate taxes affect the
competitiveness of U.S. firms. One commentator recently criticized
U.S. MNCs, noting that “U.S. multinational firms can fairly be said
not to be deeply troubled by any terminological ambiguity. To such a
firm, an ‘anticompetitive’ measure is any cost that along any
dimension might be greater than the comparable cost faced by a firm
53
not domiciled in the United States.”
Michael Knoll recently made a sophisticated attempt to make
54
amends to this definitional ambiguity.
Knoll refers to

51

See, e.g., CEO Perspectives on How the Tax Code Affects Hiring, Businesses,
and Economic Growth: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 112th Cong. (2011)
[hereinafter Finance July 27 Hearing] (testimony of Thomas J. Falk, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer, Kimberly-Clark Corporation) (arguing that “current U.S.
corporate tax system . . . puts American companies and workers at a competitive
disadvantage in the global marketplace . . . .”); Ways and Means Jan. 20 Hearing,
supra note 47 (testimony of Robert A. McDonald, Chairman, Fiscal Policy Institute
Business Roundtable) (arguing that the U.S. corporate tax system is “one of the least
competitive tax systems among developed countries”); On certain occasions, entire
hearings were framed in terms of competitiveness. See, e.g., Ways and Means May 12
Hearing, supra note 8; Ways and Means May 24 Hearing, supra note 1.
52
Jane G. Gravelle, International Corporate Income Tax Reform: Issues and
Proposals, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 469, 474 (2009) (emphasis added).
53
Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 759 n.137
(2011).
54
Knoll, supra note 8.
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competitiveness not as a characteristic of a country or a company but
55
as one that should be attributed to a “local industry.” For that
purpose, U.S. local industry can be defined in one of two ways. The
more frequently used sense of this term is “U.S.-based and U.S.56
incorporated” companies of a specific industry. Under this first
definition of local industry, a U.S. industry competes in the global
market against other national industries based in other countries.
They compete to invest elsewhere, and to sell their products around
57
the world and in their respective national markets. Under this view,
for example, a U.S. industry is more competitive than country X’s
similar industry if the U.S. industry outbids country X’s industry in a
contest to acquire an industry plant located in country Y. Thus, U.S.
taxes negatively affect the competitiveness of a U.S. industry by
lowering the after-tax return of such industry when investing abroad.
58
The higher the tax burden, the lower the bidding price it could offer.
I refer to this form of competition as “outbound competition.”
Under the second definition, a local industry is the “total
production” of a specific industry segment made within the United
59
States. Under this definition, a U.S. industry is competitive
compared to other countries’ industries if it is able to attract more
investment into the United States such that more of an industry’s
60
production is made in the United States (and not in other countries).
Here, tax may negatively affect competiveness if it reduces the aftertax return of an investor in the United States compared to the return
on an alternative investment in another jurisdiction. If the other
jurisdiction taxes profits from within its territory at lower rates than
does the United States, then the U.S. industry is at a competitive
61
disadvantage. I refer to this type of competition as “inbound
competition.”
As shall be discussed below, most participants in the discourse
refrain from noting this distinction. Ignoring this distinction is
significant because some suggestions for reform may indeed induce
one kind of competiveness but may hurt the other. Whatever the case
may be, for now, noting that competitiveness is a comparative
argument is sufficient. Competitiveness means that someone else, not
55
56
57
58
59
60
61

Id. at 774.
Id.
Id. at 776–777.
Id. at 780–81.
Id. at 774.
Id. at 778.
Id. at 784–85.
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a U.S. industry (whatever the definition may be), is competing with a
U.S. industry for the same limited resources but is subjected to a
different (more or less “competitive”) taxation system than the U.S.
industry is.
In what follows, I describe some of the main competitiveness
arguments that rely on legal comparisons in promoting tax reform
proposals (for example, I do not discuss the important debt/equity
distinction and only briefly mention some issues relating to
corporate/shareholder integration). These arguments are made,
counter-argued, and debated as part of a conscious process aimed at
advancing specific legislative tax reform proposals. The idea is to
provide a factual background of the current comparative reform
discourse rather than to portray the outlines of a theoretical academic
debate. To achieve this aim, the description below obtains its vitality
primarily from specific legislative proposals, legislative committees’
hearings, and official background papers produced for purposes of
such hearings. The comparative arguments immediately described
below are critically reviewed in Part IV.
B. Comparative Corporate Tax Rates Debate

1.

Statutory Rates

At the outset of its discussion on corporate tax reform, the
PERAB Report notes: “[t]he United States has the second highest
statutory corporate income tax rate in the Organization for Economic
62
Co-operation and Development (OECD) behind Japan.” The
Bowles-Simpson report, along the same lines, notes that the fact that
U.S. statutory corporate tax rates are “significantly higher than the
average for industrialized countries” is among the reasons why U.S.
corporations are put “at a competitive disadvantage against their
63
foreign competitors.”
These two reports demonstrates the importance of the role that
statutory corporate tax rates play in the corporate tax reform
discourse, as well as the almost unanimous (comparative) consensus in
respect thereof. Both reports start with a comparison of statutory
rates and immediately conclude that the fact that the United States
62

PRESIDENT’S ECON. RECOVERY ADVISORY BD., THE REPORT
ON TAX REFORM OPTIONS: SIMPLIFICATION, COMPLIANCE, AND
CORPORATE TAXATION 65 (2010) [hereinafter THE PERAB REPORT].
63
The Moment of Truth, supra note 8, at 28.
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has higher rates than the rest of the world is “bad.” The BowlesSimpson report explicitly calls for a reduction in the statutory
corporate tax rate combined with a broadening of the tax base to
compensate for the resulting revenue loss. This “lower the rates,
broaden the base” theme is a repeating theme among many
64
participants in the discourse (from both sides of the aisle).
It is hardly questionable that the United States currently imposes
65
a statutory corporate tax rate that is among the highest in the world.
According to OECD data, the combined federal and average state
corporate tax rate for 2010 faced by a corporation domiciled in the
66
United States was about 39.2%, far above the unweighted average of
25.6% for other OECD countries (meaning, excluding the United
States).
Interestingly, as many participants in the discourse correctly note,
67
this has not always been the case. In the early 1980s, the U.S. rate of
64

Ways and Means May 12 Hearing, supra note 8 (statement of Gregory J.
Hayes, Senior Vice-President and Chief Financial Officer, United Technologies
Corp.) (“Combined with state income taxes, the U.S. statutory income rate imposed
on corporations hovers at or near the highest among all developed economies.”);
Ways and Means May 12 Hearing, supra note 8 (statement of Mark A. Buthman,
Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, Kimberly-Clark Corp.); Ways and
Means May 12 Hearing, supra note 8 (statement of Rep. Dave Camp, Chairman, H.
Comm. on Ways and Means) (“America’s combined federal-state corporate tax
rate. . . is only outpaced by Japan’s rate. . . .”); Does the Tax System Support
Economic Efficiency, Job Creation, and Broad-Based Economic Growth?: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter Finance Mar. 8 Hearing]
(statement of Prof. Alan Auerbach, University of California Berkeley) (“Among the
lowest tax rates in leading economies just after the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the U.S.
corporate tax rate is now much higher than those in most of these other economies.”);
Finance Mar. 8 Hearing, supra (statement of Prof. Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia
University Graduate School of Business) (“Combining national and subnational tax
rates, the United States has the second highest rate of tax among OECD countries,
just behind that of Japan.”); Ways and Means Jan. 20 Hearing, supra note 47
(statement of Robert A. McDonald, Chairman, Fiscal Policy Initiative Business
Roundtable) (“[T]oday, the U.S. corporate tax system stands out as an outlier relative
to the tax systems of our trading partners, imposing a high rate of tax on corporate
income. . . .”); Ways and Means Jan. 20 Hearing, supra note 47 (statement of Kevin A.
Hassett, Director of Economic Policy Studies, American Enterprise Institute).
65
This summary of OECD data is found in Kleinbard, supra note 53, at 758–63.
66
Id. at 759. There are some minor variations in the figures among
participants.The American Enterprise Institute, for example, puts the U.S. ETR
average at 39.2%. See Hassett & Mathur, supra note 2.
67
See, e.g., Ways and Means May 12 Hearing, supra note 8 (statement of Robert
A. McDonald, Chairman, Fiscal Policy Initiative Business Roundtable); Merrill, supra
note 8, at 1010; Hassett & Mathur, supra note 2, at 3.
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fifty percent was only moderately higher than the OECD average
(excluding the United States) of about forty-seven percent. The 1986
Tax Reform Act included a significant rate reduction, bringing the
combined state and federal corporate tax rate in the United States to
its approximate current level. This placed the U.S. statutory rate
68
slightly below the then-average OECD rate. However, while U.S.
statutory rates have remained pretty much constant since then, other
69
countries have continued to cut their statutory rates. Participants in
the discourse frequently cite recent examples that include Germany
dramatically lowering its rates by ten percentage points as part of a
2008 reform; the UK lowering its statutory rate from 28% to 27% in
2011, with further gradual reductions planned over the next three
years to 24%; Canada lowering its statutory rate from 22% in 2007 to
18% last year, with a planned gradual reduction to an eventual 15%
70
starting in 2012; and China lowering its corporate tax rate from
71
33.3% to 25% in 2008. Other countries cited as examples for
corporate tax rate-reducing reforms include, among others, Greece,
Turkey, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Iceland, Ireland, Mexico,
72
Macedonia, Vietnam, and Taiwan.
With such overwhelming evidence of differences in black-letter
rates, the fact that some commentators note that “[t]here is increasing
recognition in Washington that the U.S. corporate tax rate is out of
step with the lower tax rates of most industrialized and emerging
73
nations” is hardly surprising. This recognition brings with it calls,
from almost all participants in the discourse, for the reduction of the
74
U.S. statutory corporate tax rate. These calls are evidenced in
68

Hassett & Mathur, supra note 2.
Hodge & Dammert, supra note 8.
70
Ways and Means May 12 Hearing, supra note 8 (statement of Robert A.
McDonald, Chairman, Fiscal Policy Initiative Business Roundtable); Hodge &
Dammert, supra note 8.
71
Scott A. Hodge, Countdown to #1: 2011 Marks 20th Year That U.S. Corporate
Tax Rate Is Higher than OECD Average: Fiscal Fact No. 261, TAX FOUNDATION 1
(Mar. 8, 2011), http://taxfoundation.org/sites/taxfoundation.org/files/docs/ff261.pdf.
72
These countries’ tax-lowering reforms were reported by participants of the
discourse, among others, in Hodge, supra note 71; PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP,
GLOBAL EFFECTIVE TAX RATES (2011) [hereinafter PWC REPORT].
73
Hodge, supra note 71 at 1.
74
See, e.g., Tax Reform and Foreign Investment in the United States: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways and
Means, 112th Cong. 4 (2011) [hereinafter Ways and Means June 23 Hearing]
(statement of Nancy L. McLernon, President & CEO, Organization for International
Investment (OFII)) (“OFII is united with the broader American business community
69
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multiple bills and other legislative proposals that include corporate tax
75
rate reduction.
Yet, the issue of statutory rates comparisons is not without
controversy. Edward Kleinbard argues that “the gap between U.S.
and world corporate [statutory] tax rate norms is sometimes
76
overstated.” To begin with, he notes that the dataset usually used for
purposes of these comparisons “includes sub-central government
77
taxes on corporate income.” He argues that, for purposes of
comparing competitiveness among corporate taxpayers, to include
such subcentral taxes is appropriate:
when comparing the competitive tax environment of U.S.
domestic firms to foreign firms, or when measuring the
foreign tax burden on inbound investment in a particular
country, but it is not appropriate to include U.S. sub-central
government taxes when measuring an actual or hypothetical
U.S. statutory tax burden on U.S.-domiciled multinational
firms contemplating an outbound investment, because as a
general matter foreign income is not taxed by the states of the
78
United States.
In Knoll’s terms, Kleinbard argues that only for “inbound
competitiveness” are local taxes relevant. When state income taxes
are taken out of the picture, the U.S. federal corporate income tax
rate of 35% is the one to be used in the comparisons rather than the
combined state and federal rate of 39.2%. This reduces
in its support for reducing the U.S. federal corporate income tax rate.”); Scott A.
Hodge, Ten Benefits of Cutting the U.S. Corporate Tax Rate: Special Report No. 192,
TAX FOUNDATION (May 2011), http://taxfoundation.org/sites/taxfoundation.org/
files/docs/sr192.pdf (enumerating the benefits of corporate income tax rate
reduction); The Moment of Truth, supra note 8, at 32 (recommending establishing a
single corporate tax rate between 23% and 29%). A few objections to tax cuts were
also made, but these are rare expeditions. See, e.g., Chye-Ching Huang, Corporate
Tax Rate Cut Likely to be Ineffective as Stimulus, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY
PRIORITIES (Jan. 23, 2009), http://www.cbpp.org/files/1-23-09tax.pdf.
75
See, e.g., Ways and Means Discussion Draft: Tax Reform Act of 2011, H.
COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS (Oct. 26, 2011), http://waysandmeans.house.gov/
UploadedFiles/ Discussion_Draft.pdf (proposing to cut U.S. corporate income tax
rate to twenty-five percent); H.R. 1074, 112th Cong. (2011); MADE in the USA Tax
Act, S. 3162, 110th Cong. (2008); Tax Reduction and Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 3970,
110th Cong. (2007); The Moment of Truth, supra note 8.
76
Kleinbard, supra note 53, at 759.
77
Id.
78
Id. (emphasis added).
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“uncompetitiveness” by 4.2 percentage points, which is significant.
In addition, Kleinbard argues that the unweighted average of such
taxes overstates the role of small and insignificant economies and
79
understates the role of larger economies. When the size of the
economy is taken into account, “[t]he unweighted average of the
maximum statutory corporate income tax rates of member states of
the OECD in 2006 was just about 28 percent (25.6 percent in 2010,
80
excluding in this case the United States).” This difference is hardly as
alarming as the 13.6 percentage point difference between the U.S. rate
and the OECD average rate when unweighted calculations are used.
Finally, when throwing non-OECD countries into the mix,
Kleinbard is careful to compare the U.S. tax rate only with those he
considers to be significant economies, such as the BRIC countries
(Brazil, Russia, India, and China), with an average statutory rate of
81
28.25% among the four. This is not the huge difference portrayed by
other studies, which looked at statutory rate reductions in non-OECD
countries.
2.

Effective Rates and Revenue Collection

Media reports frequently note the paradoxical contrast between
the high U.S. statutory corporate tax rates and the low real tax burden
borne by U.S. MNCs, noting that “by taking advantage of myriad
breaks and loopholes that other countries generally do not offer,
United States corporations pay only slightly more on average than
82
their counterparts in other industrial countries.” A recent wellknown New York Times story portrayed the nation’s largest
corporation, General Electric, as an aggressive tax planner that pays
little or no taxes in spite of the fact it reports billions of dollars in
83
profits. The story resulted in a nationwide outrage that forced
84
General Electric into a defensive public relations battle.
79

Id. at 760. Ample evidence exists of a positive correlation between the size of
an economy and the tax rate it imposes on its corporate taxpayers. See James R.
Hines, Jr., Corporate Taxation and International Competition 13–14 (Ross Sch. of
Bus., Paper No. 1026, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=891233.
80
Kleinbard, supra note 53 at 740.
81
Id. at 761.
82
Kocieniewski, supra note 4.
83
David Kocieniewski, G.E.’s Strategies Let It Avoid Taxes Altogether, N.Y.
TIMES, (Mar. 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/business/economy/
25tax.html.
84
General Electric, among others, posted an elaborate response on its website.
GE and Taxes, GE REPORTS (Mar. 28, 2008), http://www.gereports.com/setting-the-
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This is clearly a much more complex story than the story of
statutory rates, certainly from a comparative perspective. To start
with, participants in the discourse use the term “effective rates” to
refer to several different measurements of the tax burden faced by
corporate entities. These different measurements, when compared
85
globally, produce significantly different results. This explains the lack
of consensus among the participants in the discourse in respect of the
issue. With no agreed upon method of comparison, no consensus
exists regarding whether U.S. corporations actually face a higher,
similar, or lower burden compared to their foreign counterparts. It is
important to note that all of these measurements are purely economic,
meaning they are more an exercise of comparative public finance than
an exercise in comparative law. Such comparative financial studies,
however, contain implicit assumptions about how corporate tax laws
work in the compared jurisdictions.
The most straightforward measurement for the actual tax burden,
which is simply referred to as effective tax rate (ETR), is defined as
the total amount of actual taxes paid divided by the pretax income. A
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) study found that the ETR faced by
U.S. multinationals for a period between 2006 and 2009 was 27.7%,
which is only moderately higher than the unweighted average in the
86
OECD countries (excluding the United States) of 22.6%.
Interestingly, the PwC report also compared U.S. rates with those in
countries outside the OECD. The fifty-eight-country unweighted
average, including many less-developed economies, stood at 19.5%,
and the average in non-OECD countries stood at 16.5%, both
87
significantly lower than the ETR in the United States.
The PwC survey, which was commissioned by the Business
88
Roundtable, was harshly criticized for ignoring the size of the
89
economies and the companies surveyed. Indeed, if the size of the
record-straight-ge-and-taxes.
85
For the different measures of effectives tax corporate tax rates (ETR, EMTR,
and collection-to-GDP ratio), see footnotes 86-96 infra and accompanying discussion.
86
PWC REPORT, supra note 72, at 2. See also JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R41743, INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE TAX COMPARISONS AND
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 3 (2011) [hereinafter CRS CORPORATE TAX RATES
COMPARISONS].
87
PWC REPORT, supra note 72, at 2.
88
The Business Roundtable is an association of chief executive officers of
leading U.S. companies, founded with the aim of voicing America’s CEOs on public
policy issues. See About Us, BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, http://businessroundtable.org/
about-us (last visited Aug. 18, 2012).
89
Kleinbard Critiques PwC Effective Tax Rate Study, TAXPROF BLOG (Apr. 18,
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economy is weighted in, the OECD effective rate average is 27.7%,
which means that, according to such weighted measurement, U.S.
corporations actually face a slightly lower burden in terms of ETR
90
than the OECD average. Some commentators contend that that the
argument according to which U.S. MNCs are disadvantaged compared
91
to their foreign counterparts is simply “inconsistent with the data”
and that “many U.S. multinational firms today enjoy global effective
tax rates closely comparable to those enjoyed by foreign-based
92
competitors.”
Other more sophisticated measurements of effective tax rates
produce inconsistent results. A study from the American Enterprise
93
Institute (AEI) presented in a Ways and Means hearing report that,
94
in 2010, the effective average tax rate (EATR) faced by U.S. MNCs
was 29.0%, which compares poorly with an OECD average (excluding
95
the United States) of 20.5%. Other studies examine the effective
96
marginal tax rate (EMTR). The AEI report finds that the EMTR
faced by U.S. MNCs is 23.6%, which is substantially higher than the
2011), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2011/04/kleinbard-critiques.html.
90
CRS CORPORATE TAX RATES COMPARISONS, supra note 86 (indicating that
U.S. MNCs face an ETR of 27.1%).
91
Kleinbard, supra note 53, at 700. See also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Yaron
Lahav, The Effective Tax Rate of the Largest US and EU Multinationals 8 (U. Mich.
Pub. Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 255, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1949226 (“US-based multinationals do not face a tax induced
competitive disadvantage in competing against EU-based multinationals. Even
though the US STATUTORY rate is ten percentage points higher than the average
corporate statutory rate in the EU, the EFFECTIVE US corporate tax rate is the same
or lower than the effective EU corporate tax rate for the largest US and EU
multinationals.”).
92
Kleinbard, supra note 53, at 714.
93
The American Enterprise Institute (AEI) describes itself as “a community of
scholars and supporters committed to expanding liberty, increasing individual
opportunity and strengthening free enterprise.” AEI’s Organization and Purposes,
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, http://www.aei.org/about (last visited Aug. 18,
2012).
94
Rather than measuring the current tax liability in proportion to current
income (as in the case of simple ETR measurement), EATR measures “the impact of
current (and expected future) tax regimes on the net present value of a new
investment project.” Michael P. Devereux & Rachel Griffith, The Taxation of
Discrete Investment Choices 5 (Inst. For Fiscal Studies, Working Paper Series No.
W98/16, 1999), available at http://www.ifs.org.uk/wps/wp9816.pdf.
95
Hassett & Mathur, supra note 2, at 6.
96
This tax rate applies to “marginal investment projects in which the last unit
invested provides just enough pretax return to cause the project to break even after
taxes.” Id. at 3 (citing Devereux & Griffith, supra note 94).
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97

OECD average (excluding the United States) of 17.3%. When the
size of the economies is taken into account, however, a Congressional
Research Service (CRS) study finds that U.S. EMTR is only slightly
98
higher compared to the OECD weighted average of 21.2%.
Another economic measurement frequently cited as a proxy for
the effective tax burden borne by U.S. MNCs is the revenue collection
from corporate taxes as a share of gross domestic product (GDP).
99
Several recent reports by Citizens for Tax Justice (CTJ) argue that,
while many other countries indeed lowered their corporate tax rates,
such countries have also closed tax “loopholes.” At the same time, the
100
reports argue, the United States expanded such loopholes. As a
result, “the U.S. collects less corporate taxes as a share of GDP than
101
all but one of the 26 OECD countries for which data are available.”
Many commentators counter this perception, noting that the
measurement of the ratio of tax collection to GDP confuses cause
with effect. It is not that U.S. companies manipulate the system, the
argument goes, but rather the uncompetitive U.S. tax environment
causes U.S. MNCs to shift their activities overseas. The result is less
economic activity in the United States, which in turn results in less
102
revenue collection. This line of reasoning calls for reform that will
reduce the corporate tax burden and assumes that such reform will
pay for itself. The argument here is that a behavioral response to a
97

Id. at 4-5. See also Hodge, supra note 74, at 3; Hodge & Dammert, supra note

8.
98

CRS CORPORATE TAX RATES COMPARISONS, supra note 86, at 5–6.
Citizens for Tax Justice describes its mission as “giv[ing] ordinary people a
greater voice in the development of tax laws” and specifically as fighting “[a]gainst
the armies of special interest lobbyists for corporations and the wealthy.” Background
and History, CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, http://www.ctj.org/about/background.php
(last visited Aug. 18, 2012).
100
See U.S. Is One of the Least Taxed Developed Countries, CITIZENS FOR TAX
JUSTICE 2 (June 30, 2011), http://www.ctj.org/pdf/oecd201106.pdf [hereinafter CTJ
June 30 Report]; Analysis: 12 Corporations Pay Effective Tax Rate of Negative 1.4%
on $175 Billion in Profits; Reap $63.7 Billion in Tax Subsidies, CITIZENS FOR TAX
JUSTICE 1 (last updated Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.ctj.org/pdf/12corps060111.pdf.
101
CTJ June 30 Report, supra note 100 at 2. For documentation of the decline of
effective corporate tax rates in the U.S. over time, see Corporate Income Tax as Share
of GDP 1946-2009 , TAX POLICY CENTER (Apr. 15, 2010), http://www.taxpolicycenter.
org/ taxfacts/Content/PDF/corporate_gdp.pdf.
102
Ways and Means June 23 Hearing, supra note 74 (statement of Gary Clyde
Hufbauer, Reginald Jones Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International
Economics) (“Large firms who have a choice . . . when other things are equal. . . they
would rather invest — produce elsewhere, than in the United States. . . our tax system
does a good job of encouraging the best and brightest firms to invest abroad.”).
99
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favorable tax environment is expected to bring with it a significant
increase in economic activity in the United States, which in turn will
103
increase revenue collection in spite of a lower overall tax burden.
Another frequently cited reason for the relatively small amount of
revenue collected from corporate taxpayers in the United States is
that, under the Code, only per se corporations (so-called C
104
corporations) are subject to corporate-level taxes. The owners of C
corporations are subject to a second level of tax once a distribution of
earnings is made from the corporation to them, resulting in doublelevel taxation (once at the corporate level and again at the
shareholder level). Significantly, other forms of business entities, most
notably limited liability companies (LLCs), S corporations, and other
forms of business partnerships, are treated as “pass-throughs” for tax
purposes. This means they do not pay entity-level taxes. Rather, the
tax liability passes through to the owners, who are subject to a single
level of tax (at the owner’s level). A 2007 report by the CRS notes
that “liberal rules . . . allow firms to obtain benefits of corporate status
(such as limited liability) while still being taxed as unincorporated
105
businesses.” The CRS report also notes a significant rise of the share
of total business income in the United States received by
106
unincorporated businesses since 1980.
The natural preference created by the U.S. tax rules to operate a
business as a pass-through for tax purposes and the tax planning
opportunities associated with it brought about several calls to consider
corporate tax reform to address this issue. For example, some
commentators suggested introducing imposition of entity-level taxes
107
on what are currently treated as pass-throughs in certain cases.
Recently, Senate Finance Committee Chairman Senator Max Baucus
said that Congress should consider taxing pass-throughs as
108
109
corporations. Such proposals have met with fierce resistance.

103

For a summary of studies regarding behavioral responses to tax rate cuts as
well as critique thereof, see JANE G. GRAVELLE & THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL34229, CORPORATE TAX REFORM: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2007)
[hereinafter CRS 2007 REPORT].
104
Meaning, corporations subject to tax under subchapter C of title A of the
Code.
105
CRS 2007 REPORT, supra note 103, at 4.
106
From twenty-one percent of total business income to sixty percent (!) in 2007.
Id.
107
Martin A. Sullivan, Why Not Tax Large Passthroughs as Corporations?, 131
TAX NOTES 1015, 1015 (June 6, 2011).
108
Nicola M. White & Drew Pierson, Baucus Says Congress Should Look at
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Taxing pass-throughs, without a corresponding reduction in corporate
tax rates, the argument goes, will put “jobs at risk”, as much of the
110
U.S. work-force is employed by pass-through entities.
But here is the crucial point for purposes of this article: the debate
on whether we should tax pass-throughs is in its very essence a debate
about corporate classification for tax purposes. The issue is what kinds
of business entities should be subject to entity-level tax (hence being a
source of revenue collection). Significantly, this debate is almost
always posed in the context of a revenue collection debate or as a subdiscussion of the issue of tax evasion. With the exception of very few
comments, this issue is almost never discussed from a stand-alone
comparative prism. One of these notable exceptions is a testimony by
Robert Carroll, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Analysis
111
in the Ways and Means Committee. According to Carroll, among
the OECD countries, the United States has almost the largest
unincorporated business sector in terms of percentages as a share of
112
total businesses, second only to Mexico.
C. Who Carries the Corporate Tax Burden?
113

“Corporations don’t pay taxes, they collect them.”
This
observation adds another comparative twist to the story of tax reform,
which concerns the question of who ultimately bears the burden of
corporate taxation in each jurisdiction. This question is the subject of
a lively, sometimes heated, debate in the community of public finance
114
economists. Theoretically speaking, this question has a few possible

Taxing Passthroughs as Corporations, 2011 TNT 87-5 (May 5, 2011).
109
Ways and Means May 24 Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of the U.S.
Chambers of Commerce).
110
Id. See also How Business Tax Reform Can Encourage Job Creation: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter Ways and
Means June 2 Hearing] (statement of Mark Stutman, National Managing Partner of
Tax Services, Grant Thornton LLP).
111
Small Businesses and Tax Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select
Revenue Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 112th Cong. (2011)
[hereinafter Ways and Means Mar. 3 Hearing] (statement of Robert Carroll, Ernst &
Young LLP).
112
Id. at 7.
113
Finance Mar. 8 Hearing, supra note 64 at 9 (quoting Paul H. O’Neill)
(statement of Prof. Michael J. Graetz, Columbia Law School).
114
For a recent comprehensive review of literature on this issue, see WILLIAM M.
GENTRY, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, OTA PAPER 101, A
REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE ON THE INCIDENCE OF THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX
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answers: “corporate tax could be borne by some combination of the
shareholders of corporations, investors in all capital through a
decrease in the overall return to capital, workers through a decrease
115
in wages, and customers through increased output prices.” While the
traditional assumption is that the owners of the corporations bear the
burden through lower after-tax returns, recent empirical analysis
suggests that, in a world where capital is much more mobile than
labor, much of the burden is shifted to workers in the form of lower
116
wages. Several comparative studies found a negative correlation
117
between corporate tax rates and wages. That is to say, the higher
corporate tax rates are in a given jurisdiction compared to other
jurisdictions, the lower the wages are in that jurisdiction compared to
other jurisdictions. One recent study suggests that in the United
States, between forty-five and seventy-five percent of the corporate
118
tax burden is borne by labor, with the rest borne by capital.
Participants in the discourse occasionally use this evidence to
justify a reduction in U.S. corporate tax rates. The argument is that
with tax rates higher in the United States compared to the rest of the
world and with labor carrying most of the tax burden, the U.S. worker
119
is worse off compared to workers in other countries. One report
even explicitly cited higher wages for U.S. workers as an anticipated
120
benefit of a tax reform that would decrease corporate tax rates.

(2007).
115

Id. at 1.
Finance Mar. 8 Hearing, supra note 64 at 9 (testimony by Prof. Michael J.
Graetz, Columbia Law School) (“As the economy has become more open
internationally, a number of recent economic studies have concluded that the
corporate income tax is less likely borne by capital generally, but rather — at least in
some substantial part — by workers in the form of lower wages.”).
117
For a summary of such studies, see R. Alison Felix & James R. Hines Jr.,
Corporate Taxes and Union Wages in the United States 3–6 (Fed. Reserve Bank of
Kan. City, Regional Research Working Paper 09-02, 2009), available at
http://www.kc.frb.org/ Publicat/RegionalRWP/RRWP09-02.pdf.
118
Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley & James R. Hines Jr., Labor and Capital Shares
of the Corporate Tax: Burden: International Evidence 2 (December 2007)
(unpublished
working
paper),
available
at
http://www.people.hbs.edu
/mdesai/PDFs/Labor and Capital.pdf; Ways and Means May 12 Hearing, supra note 8
(statement of Prof. James R. Hines, Jr., University of Michigan Law School).
119
How Did We Get Here? Changes in the Law and Tax Environment Since the
Tax Reform Act of 1986: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin. 112th Cong. (2011),
[hereinafter Finance Mar. 1 Hearing] (statement of Eric Solomon and Mark E.
Weinberger, Ernst and Young LLP).
120
Hodge, supra note 74 at 2–3.
116
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D. Debate About Territoriality
Practically every participant of the discourse takes note of the fact
that the United States is among the few remaining nations to tax their
corporate entities on a global basis. Global taxation means that the
taxing jurisdiction imposes taxes on the worldwide earnings of its
corporate residents without regard to the source of such income. To
eliminate possible double taxation of the same earnings by both the
United States and the jurisdiction from which such earnings are
derived, a U.S. MNC is generally entitled to a credit in an amount of
foreign tax paid in that other jurisdiction, capped at the amount of
121
taxes that would have otherwise been paid in the United States.
The global taxation system employed by the United States is not a
“pure” one in the sense that foreign-sourced profits of U.S. MNCs are
not always immediately taxed. Generally speaking, profits from active
foreign business earned by a controlled foreign corporation (“CFC”)
that is a subsidiary of a U.S. MNC are not subject to tax in the United
States until actually repatriated (usually in the form of dividends).
This feature of the U.S. tax system, known as “deferral,” combined
with the fact that U.S. corporations can still book such foreignsourced gain in their financial statements for financial-reporting
122
purposes,
creates an obvious incentive to accumulate foreign
earnings offshore (a phenomenon that is known as the “lock-in effect”
or the “trapped earnings” problem). “Passive” income, on the other
hand, such as rents, royalties, interest, and dividends, is generally not
123
entitled to a deferral and is immediately taxed in the United States.
According to most participants, this system of global taxation
stands in sharp contrast to the corporate tax systems of other nations.
Many of the U.S. trading partners tax their corporations on a
124
territorial basis. Under a territorial system, only the earnings of the
corporations from sources within the taxing jurisdictions are taxed.
Thus, for example, a German corporation investing in the United
States will not be subject to taxation in Germany on the profits earned
from sources in the United States. Citing the fact that the United
121

I.R.C. §§ 901(a), 904.
For a discussion of the benefit to U.S. MNCs of the difference between tax
reporting versus financial reporting of foreign earnings, see Christopher H. Hanna,
Corporate Tax Reform: Listening to Corporate America, 35 J. CORP. L. 283, 308–309
(2009).
123
I.R.C. §§ 951–965 (known as “Subpart F”).
124
See Ways and Means May 24 Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Rep. Dave
Camp, Chairman, H. Comm. on Ways and Means).
122
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125

States is almost the last practitioner of an “archaic” system, multiple
commentators have vigorously advanced reform proposals with the
aim of changing the current global system of taxation of U.S. MNCs to
126
a territorial one.
Proponents of territoriality argue that the isolation of the United
States in taxing its corporations on a worldwide basis puts U.S. MNCs
at a competitive disadvantage. This competitive comparative
argument can be summarized as follows: Because most other
countries employ a territorial tax system, the active foreign earnings
of such countries’ corporate taxpayers are exempt from taxation in
their home country. For example, a German corporation making an
investment in a country X subsidiary only suffers the burden of the
taxes imposed by country X on the country X subsidiary. Assume, for
example, that country X imposes a relatively low tax rate (lower than
the tax rate in the United States). Germany will not impose any taxes
on repatriated earnings of the German corporation from country X, as
they are earned “outside” the German territorial taxing jurisdiction.
On the other hand, a U.S. corporation investing in a country X
subsidiary will be subject to the same country X taxes, as well as to an
additional level of U.S. tax upon repatriation of such earnings to the
United States. Because of this extra cost of capital in the form of
additional taxes imposed on U.S. MNCs, they will not be able to place
a lower bid than the German one when competing for the purchase of
country X’s investment. In other words, U.S. worldwide taxation
makes U.S. corporations less competitive in foreign markets. This is a
problem of “outbound competiveness.” In addition, proponents of
territoriality note that the lock-in effect prevents U.S. corporations
from bringing the money earned abroad back to the United States for
reinvestment in the U.S. economy, thereby hampering the creation of
125

Id.
See, e.g., Ways and Means May 24 Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Gary
M. Thomas, White and Case); id. (statement of Stephen Edge, Slaughter and May);
Finance July 27 Hearing, supra note 51 (statement of Michael T. Duke, President and
Chief Executive Officer, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.); id. (statement of Thomas J. Falk,
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Kimberly-Clark Corporation); id. (statement
of Gregory S. Lang, President and Chief Executive Officer, PMC-Sierra, Inc.); Ways
and Means Discussion Draft: Tax Reform Act of 2011, supra note 75; The Moment of
Truth, supra note 8, at 28. Others have suggested that if territoriality is not adopted,
the alternative would be to maintain the current system of deferral so to not further
hurt the competitiveness of U.S. MNCs. See, e.g., Robert Carroll, The Importance of
Tax Deferral and A Lower Corporate Tax Rate: Special Report No. 174, TAX
FOUNDATION (Feb. 2010), http://www.taxfoundation.org/sites/taxfoundation.org/files/
docs/sr174.pdf.
126
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U.S jobs. Rather, the lock-in effect encourages U.S. multinational
corporations to seek investment opportunities overseas to avoid the
127
repatriation tax. This is an “inbound competitiveness” problem but
of a rather limited nature because foreign investors in the United
128
States are unaffected by trapped earnings issues.
Some commentators, however, have been much more skeptical of
the argument that U.S. MNCs are disadvantaged when compared to
MNCs in jurisdictions that impose taxes on a territorial basis. In a
testimony in a hearing in the Ways and Means Committee, Avi-Yonah
rejected both comparative arguments mentioned above as justification
129
for territoriality.
With respect to the outbound competitiveness of
U.S. multinationals, Avi-Yonah noted that no good evidence exists to
suggest that the tax burden faced by U.S. multinationals in foreign
jurisdictions is higher than that of foreign counterparts. U.S. MNCs
take advantage of the foreign tax credit system and are free to move
their foreign earnings from one foreign jurisdiction to another without
130
having to pay substantial amounts of taxes. Avi-Yonah describes
here the phenomenon Kleinbard denoted as “stateless income,” which
Kleinbard defines as “income derived by a multinational group from
business activities in a country other than the domicile (however
defined) of the group’s ultimate parent company, but which is subject
to tax only in a jurisdiction that is neither the source of the factors of
production through which the income was derived, nor the domicile of
131
the group’s parent company.”
Kleinbard argues that the combination of the ability of U.S.
multinationals to freely move foreign earnings (meaning, without
triggering U.S. tax) from one foreign jurisdiction to another, the
foreign tax credit system, and the system of deferral actually enables
U.S. corporations to avoid current taxation on foreign-sourced
earnings and to even repatriate non-extraordinary amounts of such
earnings back to the United States with no (or only very low) U.S. tax
132
imposed. He then makes the functional argument that, in practice,
127

Ways and Means Jan. 20 Hearing, supra note 47 (statement of Robert A.
McDonald, Chairman, Fiscal Policy Initiative, Business Roundtable).
128
In addition, U.S. MNCs can borrow money in the U.S. at very low rates
pledging as security most of their foreign assets. See I.R.C. § 956 and Treas. Reg. §
1.956-2(c)(2) (as amended in 2012).
129
Ways and Means May 24 Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Prof. Reuven S.
Avi-Yonah, University of Michigan Law School).
130
Id.
131
Kleinbard, supra note 53, at 702-703.
132
Id. at 759 (describing the possibility of repatriating foreign income in ways
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U.S. tax rules do not operate as a “worldwide” system of taxation but
133
function as an “ersatz variant on territorial systems.”
Both Kleinbard and Avi-Yonah also reject the argument
according to which territoriality is the remedy to the trapped-cash
phenomenon. They both suggest that the United States should move
toward a purer worldwide consolidation system in order to currently
tax all income of U.S. MNCs from whatever source, at a reduced rate.
134
Current taxation will eliminate any incentive to keep earnings
abroad (as they will be taxed anyway).
Finally, Avi-Yonah and Kleinbard note some defining differences
between the United States and its trading partners that enable the
latter to impose taxes on a territorial basis. First, our trading partners
135
are all smaller economies. For residents of a small-market economy,
136
their home jurisdiction is just another source country, meaning the
inbound/outbound competition distinction plays a minor role. On the
contrary, in the United States, the home market is of major
importance to domestic MNCs. In other words, the efficiency
argument in favor of territoriality is much weaker for U.S. MNCs
since most of the economic attributes of their earnings (primarily, the
consumer base) are located in the United States anyway. Second,
geographic proximity of other jurisdictions to each other also plays a
role. For example, Kleinbard notes that, within the European Union,
territorial tax systems are easier to implement than are worldwide tax
consolidation regimes in a manner consistent with the “tightly
137
integrated nature of the European market.” Also, “[this] . . . makes
it more likely that their [MNC]s will migrate (e.g., from the UK to
Ireland) since they do not have a huge domestic market to serve (and
138
many [MNC]s need to be close to their main market).” U.S. MNCs,
on the other hand, are located within the territory that constitutes
that avoid the foreign tax credit limitation).
133
Id. at 700.
134
Ways and Means May 24 Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Reuven S. AviYonah, Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School); Edward D. Kleinbard,
The Lessons of Stateless Income, 65 Tax L. Rev. 99, 153, 155-156 (2011).
135
Ways and Means May 24 Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Prof. Reuven S.
Avi-Yonah, University of Michigan Law School); Kleinbard, supra note 134, at 139.
136
Kleinbard, supra note 134, at 139 (“By treating the residence country as just
another source country, a territorial tax regime limits the residence country’s tax base
to business activities in that country, thereby offering a neutral investment
environment for third-country shareholders.”).
137
Id. at 139.
138
Ways and Means May 24 Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Prof. Reuven S.
Avi-Yonah, University of Michigan Law School).
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139

their biggest market. Finally, other jurisdictions rely much more
heavily than the United States does on individual income taxes and
consumption taxes such as VAT, allowing them to absorb revenue
140
losses attributable to taxing corporations on a territorial basis.
E. Value Added Tax
The biggest difference between U.S. revenue composition and
that of many other countries is “that most other nations rely much
141
more heavily on consumption taxes.” The United States is “the only
OECD country that does not impose a national level tax on sales of
142
goods and services.” Such comparative assertions are frequently
made in the current discourse when discussing the possibility of
introducing VAT to the U.S. tax system as a revenue raiser that could,
143
at least in theory, partially replace our “broken system” of income
taxes (including corporate income taxes).
The exact mechanics of VAT (the complexities of which vary
from country to country) are not important for the purposes of this
article. It will suffice to note that VAT is “a type of consumption tax
that is similar to a retail sales tax but is collected in smaller increments
144
throughout the production process,” rather than at the point of sale
145
to the ultimate consumer only.
VAT is effectively used “throughout the OECD and in more than
146
150 countries worldwide.” Noting that fact, multiple participants

139

In any case, they also face “anti-inversion rules” that prevent a U.S. MNC
from shifting its location overseas in order to avoid taxes. I.R.C. § 7874.
140
Ways and Means May 24 Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Prof. Reuven S.
Avi-Yonah, University of Michigan Law School).
141
Tax Reform and Consumption-Based Tax Systems: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Ways and Means, 112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter Ways and Means July 26
Hearing] (statement of Prof. Michael J. Graetz, Columbia Law School).
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id. (statement of Prof. Rosanne Altshuler, Department of Economics, Rutgers
University).
145
For a recent comprehensive discussion on VAT mechanics from a
comparative perspective, see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-566,
VALUE-ADDED TAXES: LESSONS LEARNED FROM OTHER COUNTRIES ON
COMPLIANCE RISKS, ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS, COMPLIANCE BURDEN, AND
TRANSITION (2008), http://www.gao.gov/assets/280/274387.pdf [hereinafter GAO
VAT REPORT].
146
Ways and Means July 26 Hearing, supra note 141 (statement of Prof. Michael
J. Graetz, Columbia Law School).
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advocate tax reform that will introduce VAT in the United States.
Such suggestions are not original. VAT has been considered in the
148
United States for the past four decades.
However, these
considerations never culminated in the United States joining the rest
of the world in adopting such a system. Recent tax reform debate
induced fresh interest in VAT as part of a comprehensive reform that
will include corporate tax reform.
According to its proponents, the advantages of VAT are many.
Many such advantages are expressed as comparative arguments based
on the experience of other jurisdictions. For example, it is argued
VAT will enable the United States to finance significant rate
reductions in individual and corporate tax rates (and maybe even
149
transformation to territorial-based taxation) that will make the U.S.
tax system more competitive. One example frequently cited here is
the UK, which financed part of its recent corporate income tax
reduction by a VAT increase. In addition, other countries’
experiences demonstrate that VAT is easier and cheaper to
150
administer than income taxes. This efficiency is comparatively
proven according to some, who argue that “[g]iven its widespread
application around the world, it is clear that the U.S. can readily
151
administer and comply with a VAT.” Another advantage is that
VAT is less destructive in its effects on the economy than income tax.
VAT proponents point to the substantial body of economic research
that finds that replacing income tax with a broad-based consumption
152
tax has positive effects on economic growth in other countries. In
addition, VAT reduces the ability and incentives of politicians to give
tax breaks, easily interposed into the complex income tax system
147

Id.; Ways and Means July 26 Hearing, supra note 141 (statement of Prof.
Rosanne Altshuler, Department of Economics, Rutgers University); Tax Reform
Options: International Issues: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 112th Cong.
(2011) [hereinafter Finance Sept. 8 Hearing). In this hearing, all witnesses agreed that
the adoption of VAT is desirable.
148
Ways and Means Mar. 3 Hearing, supra note 111 at 47 (testimony of Robert
Carroll, Principal, Qualitative Economics and Statistics, Ernst & Young LLP).
149
See, e.g., Ways and Means May 24 Hearing, supra note 1 (testimony of Prof.
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, University of Michigan Law School).
150
Ways and Means July 26 Hearing, supra note 141 (statements of Prof.
Rosanne Altshuler, Department of Economics, Rutgers University and James R.
White, Dir. Strategic Issues, Government Accountability Office).
151
Id. (statement of Prof. Michael J. Graetz, Columbia Law School) (emphasis
added).
152
See, e.g., id. (statement of Prof. Rosanne Altshuler, Department of
Economics, Rutgers University).
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(which cannot so easily be done with a VAT). Finally, some argue
that the introduction into the system of a tax model commonly used
throughout the world will facilitate international coordination and fit
well with existing tax and trade agreements. This will “harmonize our
154
tax system with international standards.”
Some commentators do caution, however, that what seems to be a
worldwide phenomenon of legal convergence deserves a closer look.
Differences exist among countries in the breadth and structure of the
VAT base. In virtually all countries, certain transactions are exempted
from VAT. The extent of such exemptions varies widely. For example,
in New Zealand, ninety-eight percent of the consumption base is
155
subject to VAT. In Mexico, on the other hand, only thirty-five
156
percent of the consumption base is subject to VAT. The OECD
157
weighted average is close to fifty-four percent. There are also
substantial rate differences of the VAT imposed, from five percent in
Japan to combined federal and local rates of up to forty percent in
158
some Scandinavian countries. Some countries impose graduated tax
rates, while others impose a flat-rate VAT. To summarize, “[n]ot only
is there considerable variation in the top-line VAT rates across
countries but also in the breadth of their tax bases and the use of
159
multiple rates to address distribution concerns.”
An interesting study in that respect, conducted by the
160
Government Accountability Office (GAO),
has been recently
161
presented in a Ways and Means Committee hearing. The study
compared the VAT systems in several countries, which were selected
based on several criteria, including “the complexity of [the] VAT
design, the age of the VAT system, and whether the country had a
162
federal system.” For each country studied, the GAO “performed indepth literature reviews and conducted extensive interviews of
government officials and VAT experts. [The GAO] also collected and
153

Id. (statement of Prof. Michael J. Graetz, Columbia Law School).
Id.
155
Id. (statement of Robert Carroll, Principal, Qualitative Economics and
Statistics, Ernst & Young LLP).
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
GAO VAT REPORT, supra note 145.
161
Ways and Means July 26 Hearing, supra note 141 (statement of James R.
White).
162
Id. at 2.
154
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analyzed documents and data on the countries and their VAT
163
systems.”
The GAO report found that
[A]ll of the countries studied added complexity to their VAT
design, mainly through the use of tax preferences. . . . [S]ome
economic sectors, such as certain consumer essentials like
food and health care and public-sector organizations, are
often provided VAT preferences because of social or political
considerations. Other sectors, such as financial services,
insurance, and real estate, are provided exemptions or
exclusions because they are inherently hard to tax under a
164
VAT system.
In noting such differences, the GAO study cautions us that not
everything that looks the same is really the same. Countries with VAT
still vary in their tax base (just like in the case of income tax), and
such variations are a result of social and political preferences.
Finally, some commentators plainly reject VAT on the basis that
this widely adopted model simply did not prove to be successful at all
from a comparative point of view. First, unlike the general belief that
VAT may help to reduce government deficits, many countries with
VAT (such as Greece, Spain, and Portugal) face deficits much worse
165
in real terms than the United States. Second, such commentators
reject the argument that VAT is beneficial for competitiveness. In
fact, in terms of tax-to-GDP ratio, countries that adopted VAT have
seen an overall increase in tax burden. Prior to adoption of VAT in
the 1960s, European nations had an overall tax burden of less than
thirty percent of their GDP. Today, such nations’ tax burden is nearly
166
forty percent. In addition, comparative analysis shows that VAT
actually does not reduce the burden of income tax (meaning, VAT
does not actually replace income tax). While the income tax to GDP
burden in the United States remained relatively constant since the
1960s, the adoption of VAT was followed by increased income tax
167
burden in Europe.
Another comparative argument frequently made by anti-VAT
163

Id.
Id. at 6.
165
Ways and Means July 26 Hearing, supra note 141 (statement of Daniel J.
Mitchell, Senior Fellow, Cato Institute).
166
Id.
167
Id.
164
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commentators is an ideological one. VAT, they argue, is a “money
machine.” They point to comparative statistics that imply, so they
argue, that adopting VAT is associated with bigger government
168
spending and even bigger deficits. Based on such statistics, antiVAT commentators caution that, by adopting VAT, “America will
become a European-style welfare state. In other words, bigger
169
government and lower living standards.”
V. WHAT IS WRONG WITH THIS COMPARATIVE DEBATE?
A. In General
In the most general terms, the process of comparison is aimed at
“the search for new categories for understanding relevant similarities
170
or dissimilarities, or rethinking exiting ones.”
If comparative
arguments are made in support of legislative proposals, they must be
based on some materially accurate “comparative knowledge” to be
valid. In turn, accurate comparative knowledge is the result of a
successful comparative process.
I argue that the process of comparison within the discourse has
shown various levels of sophistication but has generally been
unsuccessful. The result is that many corporate tax reform proposals
are based on misguided comparative practice. It is still possible that
such proposals are good proposals, but if so, it is not comparative
justification that supports their legitimacy. If anything, in some cases,
better executed comparisons would point toward different policy
choices.
Two main problems arise in the current corporate tax reform
comparative discourse with respect to the execution of comparisons.
The first problem is that the comparison lacks any rigorous process
(or any process at all). Methodological coherence is almost
nonexistent. Most participants simply “compare laws.” They do not
always clearly (or coherently) define the purpose for the comparison.
Even if they seemingly do so, the purpose is many times disengaged
from the jurisdictional selection, the laws being compared, and the
method of comparison.
The second problem is that within each stage of the process (to
the extent any “process” exists), the tendency is to divorce functional
168

Id.
Id.
170
Nils Jansen, Comparative Law and Comparative Knowledge, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 18, at 305, 311 (emphasis added).
169
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from cultural analysis. Ignorance of contextual differences among
jurisdictions leads to misperceptions about how laws actually function
in practice and misses the cultural background that supports such laws
or that is expressed by them. This is better described as an ideological
disengagement. The process of comparison is wrongly viewed to be
objective. True, if comparison is successfully executed, it should
produce objective understanding about factual similarities and
differences among jurisdictions. There is, however, a choice to be
made – what do we do with the similarities and differences we have
identified? Discussion in this question is lacking. It seems that there is
an implicit assumption in the debate that if other countries “have it,”
we should probably have it as well, because it “must be right.” This
assumption is made by participants from both sides of the aisle, but in
respect of different models.
It is important to note that I do not advocate one method over the
other. I do not argue that the participants in the debate should be
functional or cultural comparativists. I argue that they should follow
at least some coherent process of comparison and, at each stage, try
to absorb the benefits of both comparative methods or at least explain
why one approach is superior to the other. I previously expressed my
skepticism about the use of functional analysis in the context of
171
comparative tax law but not because I reject functional comparison
on its face. Functional analysis has an inherent pitfall, which is the
tendency to abstract or overgeneralize complex systems. Assumption
of similarities between social problems and functions leads naturally
to an attempt, not necessarily a conscious one, to fit sets of facts into
172
presupposed patterns.
This happens, for example, when a
comparative question is posed in a terminological rather than a factual
way (rather than asking how other countries dealt with capital flight,
we ask how other countries dealt with “competitiveness”). It is easy to
assume that, if many jurisdictions reduce their corporate tax rates,
they all do it for the same reason. It is even possible that this is indeed
the case. Most jurisdictions face the same global competiveness
concerns, and reducing tax rates is a natural response to capital flight.
Namely, rate reduction can easily be assumed to respond to a similar
problem across jurisdictions. Once the patterns are clear and fit into
our presupposed model, we are tempted to stop the inquiry.
To be sure, I do believe that functional analysis is probably a
correct way to launch a comparison. When multiple jurisdictions

171
172

Marian, supra note 10, at 460–69.
See generally Frankenberg, supra note 20, at 444–45.
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adopt what seems to be a similar response to what seems to be a
similar problem (such as in the case of corporate tax reform and
international competition), it is a good starting point to assume that
this model works. But it is important not to uncritically extend such
assumption beyond its instrumentality as a heuristic device. We must
be vigorous about questioning the validity of this assumption and try
to identify differences about this “same model” as adopted in each
jurisdiction. Only by doing so can we confirm or reject a comparative
idea. And this is where cultural analysis comes into play, as it
questions if what we believe to be functioning similarly in each
173
jurisdiction does indeed function similarly in each jurisdiction.
In what follows, I show the failures (and note the few successes)
in current corporate tax reform discourse. I do so by following the
process that participants in the discourse should have followed and
show that the failure to follow the process, together with the failure to
coherently execute each stage of the process, resulted many times in
questionable comparative arguments. Therefore, I will discuss in turn
the expressions in the current debate of (a) the purpose of
comparisons, (b) jurisdictional selections, (c) the choice of laws to be
compared and their breadth, and (d) the method of comparison.
B. Different Purposes for Different Tax Reforms
Many participants in the discourse refer to recent reforms that
took place in other jurisdictions. When considering reforms, it makes
a lot of sense to look at other reforms that recently took place.
However, the fact that another reform happens somewhere else does
not make it immediately relevant for our own reform process. We
must consider the drivers for the other reforms, as well as their
outcomes. Many commentators fail here. Some just point to recently
adopted models without considering the problems that created the
need to adopt such models elsewhere. Others simply misinterpret the
reforms that took place elsewhere. Finally, an issue of framing exists. I
173

An excellent example for this combination of functional and cultural analytics
in the field of comparative tax studies is Michael Livingston’s comparative research
on the nature of progressivity. Progressivity is a well-accepted and almost globally
adopted model of income taxation. However, questioning how progressivity actually
functions in the context of varying cultural contexts, Livingston concludes that, while
“nations face similar economic challenges, they have significant political and cultural
differences that may cause them to take divergent paths.” Livingston, From Mumbai
to Shanghai, with a Side Trip to Washington, supra note 22, at 559; see also Livingston,
From Milan to Mumbai, Changing in Tel Aviv, supra note 22; Likhovski, supra note
21.
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argue that when taking a comparative look, many participants frame
the problem to be addressed in comparative inquiry in a way that
makes the inquiry useless from the very beginning. When the Ways
and Means Committee announces a “Hearing on How Other
Countries Have Used Tax Reform to Help Their Companies Compete
in the Global Market and Create Jobs,” it assumes a priori that other
jurisdictions indeed reformed their systems in order “to help their
companies compete in the global market and create jobs.” If this
assumption turns out to be wrong, the entire comparative process is at
peril.
I look at three frequently referenced reforms and demonstrate
how each of them is, at least to a certain extent, misrepresented in
terms of its purposes (probably unintentionally) in order to support
certain arguments. The first is the Japanese 2009 corporate tax
reform, which is frequently cited to support the move toward a
territorial system. The second reform discussed is the German
corporate tax reform of 2008, which is usually cited to justify a
dramatic reduction in statutory rates. The third reform discussed is the
set of recent business tax reforms in the United Kingdom, which
frequently underlies arguments for reform that should include both
rate reduction and territoriality.
1.

Why Countries Reform Their Corporate Tax Systems

In the context of competitiveness arguments, Japan is repeatedly
mentioned as an example of a country that passed a recent bold
reform, transforming its system of corporate taxation from global to
174
territorial. Even if on paper Japan did move from a global to a
territorial regime (I subsequently question whether this is indeed the
case), whether competitiveness was the main driver of such reform is
not clear. To be sure, competitiveness was considered in the context of
175
the Japanese reform but by no means to the same extent as it is
considered in the United States.
In 2007, the Tax Commission of the Japanese Government
published a document, titled “Basic Idea for Fundamental Reform of
174

See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 126, at 2; Ways and Means International Tax
Reform Discussion Draft: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures
of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Timothy
Tuerff, Deloitte Tax LLP); Ways and Means May 24 Hearing, supra note 1 (statement
of Gary M. Thomas, White and Case).
175
Ways and Means May 24 Hearing, supra note 1 (testimony of Gary M.
Thomas, White and Case).
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Tax System” (the Basic Idea report). The report starts by noting it is
“designing the desired fundamental reform of the tax system that is
based on the three-pillar principle of taxation ‘fairness, neutrality, and
177
simplicity.’” Competitiveness was not mentioned as a primary
consideration.
The discussion starts by noting the “fairness” purpose, explaining
that fairness means “a tax system that supports the safety and security
178
of the people.” The concern of the reform responds to a major social
problem the committee sought to address: the “development of an
aging society with fewer children at a speed unprecedented among the
major developed countries and the beginning of Japan’s
transformation into a super-aged society with a shrinking
179
population.” This is a perfect example of a completely localized
consideration that plays an important role in the design of tax reform.
While aging is certainly a problem in the United States as well, it is
not frequently discussed in the context of corporate tax reform. When
the Basic Idea report moves to discuss the “neutrality” pillar of tax
reform, it indeed addresses the need to “invigorate” the Japanese
economy. But it does so in the context of the other relevant issues,
noting that “Japan needs a vibrant and strong economy and society to
provide the foundation that supports people’s secure and comfortable
180
living as the population ages with the birthrate declining.”
These considerations evidently had an effect on the committee
when considering corporate tax rates. The committee actively
considered a dramatic reduction in Japan’s corporate tax rate, the
highest in the world in statutory terms, to address competitiveness
concerns raised by business groups. Unlike the Bowles-Simpson
report, the committee made no conclusive recommendation in this
respect, but noted that corporate tax rate reduction should be
considered, along with base broadening and having larger parts of the
181
public “share the burden of supporting social security.” Instead, the
committee recommended introducing “a system of policy tax
incentives designed to invigorate the economy led by the corporate
sector . . . by focusing instruments upon the fields that really need
176

Tax Commission, Ministry of Finance Japan, Basic Idea for Fundamental
Report of Tax System (2007), http://www.mof.go.jp/english/tax_policy/ tax_
commission/e0711a.pdf.
177
Id. at 6.
178
Id.
179
Id. at 4.
180
Id. at 9.
181
Id. at 10.
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182

them.”
So why did Japan adopt a territorial system of corporate taxation
after all? Apparently, the committee was concerned about a problem
all too familiar to the U.S. tax legislator: the problem of trapped
earnings. Until 2009, Japanese MNCs were taxed in a fashion similar
to U.S. MNCs: worldwide basis of taxation, combined with foreign tax
credit. Foreign active earnings were not taxed until repatriated,
183
causing a “distinct bias against the repatriation of foreign earnings.”
In 2008, the committee published another policy recommendation. It
noted that the current system distorts dividend policy. Specifically, in
the 2008 report, the committee advanced a reform with three major
aims: (1) viewpoint neutrality regarding corporate decisions on
dividend policy, (2) maintaining relief from double taxation, and (3)
184
simplicity. To emphasize, neutrality is the purpose advanced here,
not competitiveness, which may or may not go hand in hand with
neutrality (a system that subsidizes its local residents is certainly
competitive in certain aspects but hardly neutral).
One way to deal with the dividend neutrality issue would be to
reduce corporate tax rates. However, when push came to shove and
legislation had to be introduced, this alternative was explicitly
rejected. The deficit faced by the Japanese government was simply too
big to absorb revenue losses from rate reduction and a move to a
territorial system. It was also recognized that such a rate reduction
would have to have been financed by taxpayers other than
corporations. Instead, Japan adopted a dividend exemption system
under which ninety-five percent of repatriated foreign dividends are
exempted from taxation in Japan.
What can we learn from our brief discussion on the purposes for
Japanese corporate tax reform? First, participants in corporate tax
reform discourse in the United States sometimes ignore the different
context in which the Japanese reform operated. An aging population
and declining childbirth obviously played a role.
Second, participants in the discourse who urge us to look at how
competitiveness is a catalyst in other countries’ reforms and who cite
Japan as an example miss the fact that competiveness played a role
significantly less important than what it is playing in the U.S.
discourse.

182

Id.
Yoshihiro Masui, Taxation of Foreign Subsidiaries: Japan’s Tax Reform
2009/10, BULL. FOR INT’L TAX’N 242, 242 (Apr. 2010).
184
Id. at 243.
183
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Third, some similarities of functions and problems do exist in both
the United States and Japan, but these similarities are frequently
ignored, too. Many participants of the discourse, who mention the
Japanese reform as an example of recent transformation to
territorially, are also calling for rate reduction in the United States.
They seem to disregard the fact that Japan specifically considered
meaningful rate reduction and rejected the idea due to deficit
185
concerns. Deficit is certainly a problem in the United States too.
Seemingly, for the most part, proponents of territoriality look at
Japan only because it adopted territoriality. They do not question
whether Japan adopted territoriality for the same reason we might
want to adopt it. They just point to the fact that the Japanese “have
it.” Significantly, it is also not clear that the Japanese reform has been
successful in “invigorating the economy” by eliminating the
disincentive to repatriate earnings. Given that proponents of
territoriality frequently explain that dividend repatriation will boost
the economy by injecting capital into the home market, they refrain,
surprisingly, from looking at recent evidence from other economies.
The immediate outcome of the move toward territoriality in Japan has
been a dramatic increase in repatriated earnings. While the reform is
too recent to provide conclusive data, anecdotal evidence suggests
that, so far, repatriated profits were used to support dividend
payments and stock buybacks rather than invested in the Japanese
186
home market. Thus, at least in the short term, it seems that the
purpose for the move to territoriality, as framed by its supporters in
the United States, has not been achieved.
This result should not come as a surprise to any U.S. tax scholar.
187
In 2004, the American Jobs Creation Act added Section 965 to the
Internal Revenue Code, allowing temporary repatriation relief in the
form of a deduction of eighty-five percent of all dividends received
from foreign corporations during the relief period. Significantly, the
relief was conditioned on the adoption of certain domestic investment
plans by the repatriating corporations. The idea was to make sure that
repatriated earnings are actually invested so as to stimulate the
economy. However, because money is fungible, it becomes almost
impossible to enforce the domestic-investment requirement. It is well
documented that this repatriation holiday bitterly failed. Multiple
studies “generally conclude that reduction on tax rate on repatriated

185
186
187

Id. at 243–44.
Id. at 245.
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418.
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earnings led to a sharp increase in repatriated earnings, but that the
repatriations did not increase domestic investment or employment.
[These studies] further conclude that much of the repatriations were
188
returned to shareholders through stock repurchases.”
Another system recently reformed, which is also frequently
referred to in current discourse, is the United Kingdom’s. From the
point of view of the purpose for reform, this reform provides a much
better functional comparison because competitiveness of U.K. MNCs
was the defining objective of the reform. In 2007, the U.K. Treasury
published a discussion document, titled “Taxation of the Foreign
189
Profits of Companies” (the U.K. discussion paper). The U.K.
discussion paper explicitly cites the pressures of international
190
competition as a driver of the reform and summarizes one of the
main reform objectives as “intended to improve the competitiveness
and attractiveness of the U.K. as a location for multinational
191
business.”
Before the reforms, the taxation of foreign source income by the
United Kingdom was quite similar to the tax system in the United
States, with a worldwide basis of taxation, coupled with a foreign tax
credit system. At that time, the United Kingdom had already begun a
process of corporate tax rate reduction. The United Kingdom also had
a controlled foreign corporation (CFC) regime in place. Interestingly,
this regime was much more stringent than the U.S. regime. The old
CFC regime operated as an “all or nothing” method under which all
of the income of a CFC would have been immediately taxed
regardless of its passive or active character. This was really a close
functional equivalent of worldwide consolidation, meaning that there
was relatively little incentive not to repatriate earnings from foreign
subsidiaries.
Nevertheless, in 2009, the United Kingdom did adopt a dividend
exemption system similar to the one adopted by Japan the same year.
Why? The answer is rather simple: geography. In 2006, the European
188

DONALD J. MARPLES & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R40178, TAX CUTS ON REPATRIATION EARNINGS AS ECONOMIC STIMULUS: AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 3 (2011); See also U.S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL
AFFAIRS, REPATRIATING OFFSHORE FUNDS: 2004 TAX WINDFALL FOR SELECT
MULTINATIONALS (2011).
189
HM TREASURY, TAXATION OF THE FOREIGN PROFITS OF COMPANIES: A
DISCUSSION DOCUMENT, 2007 (U.K.).
190
Id. §§ 2.7–2.8.
191
Id. § 2.19.
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Court of Justice (ECJ) determined in Cadbury Schweppes that the
United Kingdom could not impose its CFC regime on foreign
subsidiaries of U.K. MNCs if those CFCs operated and created profits
overseas because such a regime interferes with the EU principle of
freedom of establishment. Effectively, the ECJ left the U.K.’s CFC
193
regime in ruins. The U.K. discussion paper tried to mitigate this
result a bit by introducing a suggestion for a “modernized” CFC
regime in which only passive income will be taxed. This resulted in a
standoff between the U.K. Treasury and the U.K. MNCs, which
viewed the report as inconsistent with the Cadbury Schweppes
194
decision.
You might wonder where the CFCs at issue in Cadbury
Schweppes were located. Well, let me just say that the corporate tax
rate in Ireland at the time was 12.5%, less than half of the rate then
applicable in the United Kingdom. Following Cadbury Schweppes, the
United Kingdom could not tax foreign subsidiaries of U.K. MNCs that
had anything that even remotely resembled real-operations overseas.
This was combined with the fact that the distance between (hightaxed) London and (low-taxed) Dublin is about 290 miles, which can
be covered in about an hour flight. You do not need to be a tax expert
to guess what happened after that. Indeed, U.K. MNCs and their
195
subsidiaries started to flock across the Irish Sea. The U.K. move to a
territorial system can be easily described as an attempt by the U.K.
Treasury to save the U.K. corporate tax base.
The special challenge faced by the United Kingdom was a
combination of the United Kingdom’s being an EU member and thus
being bound by the ECJ decisions together with its geographic
proximity to a low-tax industrialized jurisdiction such as Ireland. This
is a unique set of circumstances that, as of the time of this article, is
196
not applicable to the United States. Some participants in the
192

Case C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes plc & Cadbury Schweppes Overseas Ltd.
v. Comm’rs of Inland Revenue, 2006 E.C.R. I-7995.
193
The decision made it possible for the United Kingdom to collect revenue from
foreign sources only in the case of CFCs created as a “wholly artificial” arrangement,
which is an extremely narrow standard. Id.
194
Ways and Means May 24 Hearing, supra note 1, at 96–97 (statement of Steve
Edge, Slaughter & May).
195
In the year following the Cadbury Schweppes decision, ten U.K. MNCs
migrated to Ireland and other low tax jurisdictions, compared to one in the year
before. Id, at Appendix B.
196
It might become relevant if Canada continues reducing its corporate tax rates,
though currently, no legal authority could force the U.S. to abandon its CFC regime
or anti-inversion rules.
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corporate tax reform discourse in the United States who advocate a
197
move to territoriality cite the United Kingdom as an example. They
point to such reform as a possible response to corporate migration
198
away from the United States. When they do so, they misperceive the
unique set of facts that the United Kingdom faced. Unlike the U.K.
case, no documented evidence exists of real migration of U.S. MNCs
199
to other jurisdictions due to tax reasons (by real migration, I mean
the migration of the real economic activities and operations to
another jurisdiction, not pocketbook incorporation). U.S. MNCs
simply do not have a cheap enough option that is both geographically
close to the home market and very lightly taxed. In other words,
noting corporate migration in other jurisdictions that adopted a
territorial system is not as comparatively relevant when making a case
for adopting territoriality in the United States.
Another example of ill-executed functional comparison arises in
the context of the German Business Tax Reform of 2008. The
German reform included a dramatic cut in statutory corporate tax
200
rates (from 38.6% to 29.83%, inclusive of local taxes) and thus is
frequently invoked to justify similar cuts in the United States.
Discussions on comprehensive tax reform in Germany started in
2005 primarily as a response to the increasing complexity of the
German tax system. Another driver of the reform was
competitiveness, as German corporate tax rates at the time were
201
among the highest in the European Union. Thus, the German
reform makes an excellent candidate for functional comparison
because it shared two of the purposes for the U.S. prospective reform:
competitiveness and simplicity.
Improvement had to be achieved under the constraint of political
compromise between the right-wing tax writers, who advocated
dramatic rate reductions, and the left, who resisted such changes,

197

See, e.g., supra note 174. See, e.g., Ways and Means May 24 Hearing, supra
note 1, at 10 (statement of Stephen Edge, Slaughter & May).
198
See, e.g., Ways and Means May 24 Hearing, supra note 1, at 195–98 (statement
of Steve Edge, Slaughter & May); Finance Sept. 8 Hearing, supra note 147 (statement
of Scott M. Naatjes, Vice President and General Tax Counsel, Cargill, Inc.).
199
Eric Allen & Susan Morse, Firm Incorporation Outside the U.S.: No Exodus
Yet (Oct. 27, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=1950760.
200
Wolfgang Kessler & Rolf Eicke, Germany’s Corporate Tax Reform – The
Road Not Taken, 46 TAX NOTES INT’L 1135, 1135 (June 11, 2007).
201
Christopher Wright, The German Business Tax Reform 2008 – Background,
Context, and Practical Implications, 9 BUS. L. INT’L 289, 294–295 (2008).
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pointing to the increasing deficit and the need to support revenue
collection. The political compromise called for a reform that will (1)
reduce combined state and local corporate tax rates to thirty percent
and (2) restrict revenue loss to EUR 5 billion (about one percent of
202
the tax revenue).
Clearly, the perception that corporate tax rate
reductions “pay for themselves” has not been seriously considered a
remedy to the increasing deficit in Germany, a fact regularly ignored
by participants pointing to Germany as an example (who are also the
participants sometimes arguing that rate reductions “pay for
themselves”). Hence, it has been decided that, together with rate
reduction, the corporate tax base will be significantly expanded. The
specific details of the reform are discussed more elaborately below.
Yet, in current debate in the U.S., the most visible feature of the
German reform (always cited by U.S. reform commentators) is rate
reduction and not the base-broadening measures.
The most striking functional failure associated with the frequent
reliance on the German reform for competitiveness arguments is that
many participants overlook the fact that, within Germany, many
perceive the 2008 reform as unsuccessful (to say the least). In terms of
achieving competitiveness for German corporations, views of the
203
204
reform vary from mild improvement to an utter failure. One
205
German commentator even labeled the reform as “reactionary.” In
terms of achieving simplicity, it seems that there is across-the-board
206
agreement that the 2008 reform made things much worse.
I further discuss some specifics of the 2008 German reform below.
But the first functional lesson of this reform is clear. Apparently, the
German reform shared similar purposes with the corporate tax reform
currently being advocated in the United States. The German reform
failed to achieve those purposes. It thus seems weird that proponents
of competitiveness and simplification in the United States insist that
we should look at the German reform for guidance. Of course, we
might make amends to this failure by taking a cultural approach,
trying to identify the contextual differences between Germany and the
202

Id. at 296, 310; Stefan Homburg, Fiscal Policy in Action: Germany’s Company
Tax Reform Act of 2008, 63 PUB. FIN. ANALYSIS 591, 594 (2007).
203
Kessler & Eicke, supra note 200.
204
See Wright, supra note 201, at 319 (“[G]iven all. . . positive preconditions, the
German Business Tax Reform 2008 is a failure.”); see also Homburg, supra note 202,
at 609–11; Kessler & Eicke, supra note 200.
205
Wright, supra note 201, at 321.
206
See, e.g., Kessler & Eicke, supra note 200, at 1137; Wright, supra note 201, at
319; Homburg, supra note 202, at 610–11.
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United States. Such an approach could potentially explain the failure
in Germany and suggest why the German approach could nonetheless
work in a U.S. context. No participant seems to suggest such an
approach.
2.

Framing Comparisons

The cases of recent reforms in Japan, the United Kingdom, and
Germany are all perfect examples of how participants in the discourse
fail to identify functional similarities and contextual dissimilarities in
the drivers of corporate tax reforms undertaken elsewhere. The
referral to such reforms is usually simplistic and frequently does not
rise above the level of “let’s do what they did.” Generally, such
comparisons lack real consideration of why “they” did what they did,
whether we can (or should) do the same, and whether what “they” did
actually achieved the targets “they” were hoping to achieve.
Such simplicity is many times induced by the way in which
participants in the discourse access the legal comparison in the first
place. Rather than identifying similarities (or differences) in reform
purposes in other countries, participants in the discourse assume their
existences a priori. Many times, the comparison starts with a question
that frames the comparative problem in U.S. terms.
This argument is best explained with an actual example. On May
24, 2011, the Ways and Means Committee held a hearing on corporate
tax reform in other countries. The hearing was titled a “Hearing on
How Other Countries Have Used Tax Reform to Help Their
Companies Compete in the Global Market and Create Jobs.” In his
announcement of the hearing, the Way and Means Chairman Rep.
Dave Camp explained:
as part of the Committee’s ongoing consideration of how best
to reform the tax code in order to help grow the U.S.
economy and create good jobs for hard-working Americans,
this hearing will examine the experiences of other countries in
order to identify best practices in designing stable, pro-growth
tax policies that would help American companies compete
207
against their foreign counterparts.

207

Press Release, Rep. David Camp, Chairman, House Comm. on Ways and
Means, Camp Announces Hearing on How Other Countries Have Used Tax Reform
to Help Their Companies Compete in the Global Market and Create Jobs (May 17,
2011), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/News/ DocumentSingle.aspx?
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Framing the purpose of the hearing as such could prove to be
successful if the witnesses invited would indeed testify on tax reforms
aimed at competitiveness and job growth in their home countries. But
three of the witnesses came from (a) Japan, a jurisdiction in which
recent corporate tax reform was induced by neutrality and fairness to
a much greater extent than competitiveness and jobs-creation; (b) the
United Kingdom, in which reform was induced by competitiveness but
under terms completely different from those faced by the United
States; and (c) Germany, whose reform had been declared by some as
a complete failure regarding competitiveness.
C. Improper Jurisdictional Selection
One of Kleinbard’s complaints about participants in the discourse
is that when they discuss competitiveness they fail to compare the
United States with “relevant” jurisdictions. The United States, he
argues, “does not need to compete with the tax rates available to
domestic firms in the Slovak Republic (19%, as it happens) for U.S.
208
firms to be competitive on the global stage.”
Kleinbard’s argument about the relevance of jurisdictions to be
compared seems to rest primarily on the size of their economy. I agree
that participants in the discourse fail to properly select the
jurisdictions for comparison. I also agree that the size of the economy
is a relevant factor for selection. But additional relevancy factors need
to be addressed as well. My aim in this subpart is to put jurisdictional
relevancy in a theoretical context and explain how improper
jurisdictional selection skews comparative arguments.
Interestingly, comparative tax legal academics made at least some
209
effort to explain their jurisdictional selection. This is certainly of
great importance in a reform discussion if we wish to adopt models
widely adopted elsewhere. Unfortunately, in spite of such available
guidance from legal tax scholars, participants in the discourse failed to
follow a coherent method (if any) of jurisdictional selection. Many
comparative arguments, resting primarily on studies of comparative
finance, use one of three possible criteria as guidance for jurisdictional
selection: the first criteria is to compare the United States to other
OECD countries or other industrialized economies; the second is to
compare the U.S. system with the systems of its so-called “trading
partners”; and the third is to simply compare the U.S. system with—
DocumentID=241895.
208
Kleinbard, supra note 134, at 158.
209
See Marian, supra note 10, at 446–49.
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for lack of a better defining character—the rest of the world.
Of the three criteria for jurisdictional selection, comparing the
United States to other OECD countries seems to be the most logical
functional classification criterion, as the OECD members share
certain economic and political characteristics that may make them
functionally comparable. But this is not always the case. OECD
countries represent multiple legal families with completely different
legal traditions and varying sophistication of legal systems. The same
argument is correct in respect to our “trading partners” and certainly
in respect to the rest of the world (which is not a coherent criterion at
all). There is, however, a more significant functional problem of
jurisdictional selection in current discourse. Jurisdictional selection
should support the purposes of the comparison. How any of the three
criteria for jurisdictional selection described above support a reform
that is aimed at competitiveness is not clear. If competitiveness is our
reform purpose, we need to compare our corporate tax system to
systems of jurisdictions with which we compete. As explained below,
participants failed in this simple task.
The reason for this failure, in turn, is that participants in the
discourse did not take the time to develop a sophisticated enough
concept of competitiveness. As explained above, Knoll has done this,
but his arguments have been largely ignored in the context of the
discourse. For example, let us look at Knoll’s concept of competition
to which I referred as outbound competition. To say that the tax
environment in the United States is uncompetitive in that respect, we
must compare it to the tax environment of other jurisdictions that are
significant exporters of capital, meaning only jurisdictions that are
home countries for investors making outbound investments, who
actually compete with U.S. investors for opportunities outside their
home jurisdiction. As Kleinbard suggests, the countries compared
should also have significant enough economies to be able to export
enough funds to pose a real competitive threat to U.S. investors.
Estonia, Iceland, Israel, the Slovak Republic, Luxemburg, and
Poland—all OECD member countries—do not meet these tests, nor
do many other OECD member countries mentioned. An extreme
example for such failure is the recent PwC survey of effective tax
rates, which took into account countries such as Morocco, Egypt,
Nigeria, Bermuda, Liechtenstein, and Venezuela. These countries are
not homes to investors with which U.S. MNCs investing abroad
compete. The PwC survey, I argue, is simply irrelevant for outbound
competitiveness comparison because of its jurisdictional selection
(regardless of its other methodological shortcomings).
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Participants in the discourse are also at fault regarding
jurisdictional selection in respect to Knoll’s second type of
competitiveness, to which I referred above as inbound competition. A
more elaborate explanation is necessary here. We must start by noting
the obvious, that investors do not decide where to locate their
investments based on taxes. As one prominent tax practitioner once
noted: “I have never met a businessman (or even a tax executive) who
was actually involved in decision-making about the tax issues of where
to locate a business (that actually employed people) who would agree
that his MNC employer acted to invest somewhere because of an
interest-free loan of residual U.S. corporate tax if the company
invested in a foreign country rather than the United States. Businesses
follow customers, efficient delivery of material and productive work
forces to such an extent that tax incentives are often just an
210
afterthought.”
Tax is a marginal investment consideration. When considering the
U.S. tax system’s inbound competitiveness, we must work through two
steps. The first is to identify jurisdictions that offer investment
opportunities in their territory that are comparable or substitutive (at
least to a certain degree) with investments offered in U.S. territory.
For example, a foreign investor wishing to make an investment in the
automobile industry might consider the United States but might also
consider Japan or Germany, making such jurisdictions successful
choices for comparison. On the other hand, an investor looking to
start a Scotch distillery is more likely to prefer Scotland over the
United States, but not because of the former’s lower tax rates.
Therefore, it makes sense to compare jurisdictions that, in economic
terms, have similar comparative advantages. It is not clear why
countries such as Bermuda and the Cayman Islands, which have no
substantial economies, were taken into account in the PwC survey (as
well as other surveys). Investors do not consider such places for
anything other than pocketbook incorporation of companies or for
weekend retreats.
Second, even after we identify a comparable jurisdiction in terms
of the investment alternative it offers, such jurisdiction must also be at
least somewhat comparable to the United States in terms of
investment considerations other than taxes, such that the investment
decision will actually turn on taxes. In other words, if we seek to

210

The Foundation of International Tax Reform: Worldwide, Territorial, and
Something in Between: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 110th Cong. 2 (2008)
(statement of Robert H. Dilworth, McDermott, Will, and Emery).
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reform the U.S. tax system to make it attractive to investment, it might
make sense to compare the United States to, say, Germany, where
one could assume that the costs of labor and capital are about the
same. In such a case, the decision where to locate completely
substitutive investments could actually turn on taxes since taxes make
a marginal difference. On the other hand, it makes no sense to
compare the United States to, say, China (as often is the case), where
the costs of labor and capital investments are dramatically lower than
in the United States. When a U.K. investor makes a decision to open a
textile factory in China and not in the United States, it is not because
of the U.S. tax rates. It is because the costs of building, machinery,
labor, and the operation of the factory in China are much cheaper. To
make the U.S. tax system competitive enough so investors will decide
to locate their factories in the United States instead of China means
that the U.S. Department of Treasury would have to start handing out
checks to investors to compensate them for the much higher nontax
costs associated with operating a real business in the United States.
Simply grouping together OECD countries and comparing their
tax systems to ours provides no guidance for U.S. corporate tax
reform aimed at “competitiveness.” To be sure, I am not implying by
any means that competition does not exist. Of course it does. The
argument is that we do not compete with everybody for everything.
Our local industries compete with some jurisdictions in world markets
(outbound competition). Our local industries do compete for foreign
investment (inbound competition). But any functional comparison
must start by identifying the relevant jurisdictions with which we
compete. These are the jurisdictions with which we need to compare
ourselves, and, depending on the type of competition (inbound or
outbound), these jurisdictions might be different in each case.
Jurisdictional selection in current discourse can also be criticized
from a cultural point of view. As Livingston concluded, in the context
of income tax progressivity, tax models that appear to be the same
actually operate very differently depending on specific localized
211
contexts, thus achieving very different results. The same holds true
in current debate with respect to the VAT argument. Proponents for
the adoption of VAT keep telling us that more than 150 other
countries have adopted VAT and that this is a successful model. As
explained in the descriptive part above, few commentators gave
serious consideration to contextual differences. Such commentators
noted that the VAT base varies substantially among jurisdictions both
211

Livingston, From Milan to Mumbai, Changing in Tel Aviv, supra note 22.
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in terms of the breadth of the base and in terms of the specific
preferences and exemptions awarded to certain types of transactions
or particular industry sectors. As any cultural comparative scholar
would argue, this reflects local preferences that are most likely
embedded in political, ideological, or cultural contexts. Such systems
cannot simply be copied.
When localized contexts are taken into consideration, the
“everyone else has it” argument might lose its appeal. For example,
one of the most common critiques that VAT opponents frequently
make is that it is not clear how federal VAT will interact with state
212
consumption tax collection.
The argument concerns, first and
foremost, the difficulty of administering two types of consumption
taxes imposed on each transaction. But the argument is also an
ideological one about the power (or lack of it) of the federal
government to interfere with revenue collection at the state level.
Both of these issues are highly contextual to the United States. In fact,
the only other country that in recent times successfully introduced
federal-level VAT-like taxes where such taxes had to interact with
existing local consumption taxes collected by the subdivisions of the
federal government is Canada.
The experience of Canada GST’s (gross sales tax) interaction with
the provinces’ consumption tax is regarded as successful. This
probably makes Canada’s GST reform a good candidate for
comparison. That said, it is one system that experienced similar
federal–local conflict in such context. An argument based on the
successful experience of one jurisdiction is hardly as convincing as an
argument based on the allegedly similar experience of 150
jurisdictions. Also, it is not clear that the political background of
federal and state interaction in Canada operates the same as in the
United States. Most comparative culturalists will assume it does not.
To summarize this point, most VAT proponents share the same
sin as rate-reduction and territoriality proponents. Both point to what
“everyone else did.” Indeed, almost everyone else reduced corporate
tax rates, but if we are functionalists seeking to achieve
competitiveness, we should care only about countries with which we
actually compete. Indeed, everyone else has VAT, but, if we are
culturalists, we must be skeptical about the argument that VAT is the
same thing in all places.
As discussed above, some more elaborate attempts to explain the
212

See, e.g., Ways and Means July 26 Hearing, supra note 141 (testimony by
Daniel J. Mitchell, Senior Fellow, Cato Institute).
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choice of jurisdiction were made in the case of the GAO VAT survey
and by Kleinbard in his tax burden comparison. Unfortunately, those
are the exceptions to the rule, and participants in the discourse seem
to compare based on the availability of data (such in the case of the
OECD). Availability of data is not a good criterion for jurisdictional
selection.
D. Selection of Legal Models to Compare
I now turn to the selection of models to be compared. As
discussed in the theoretical section, we must compare meaningful
enough models to give a sense of how the system operates. First, if we
are functionalists, we must identify non-abstract functionallyequivalent models to compare. Second, one needs to avoid
compartmentalization, meaning the comparison of too narrowly
defined models. A compartmentalized approach produces an
unsystemic analysis, which provides little real guidance. Third, one
must avoid overgeneralization. If we believe that tax systems perform
a multiplicity of functions, consolidating them all into some single unit
to be used as an object of comparison would necessitate the
preference of some functions over others.
1.

What Is the Comparative Function of Corporate Taxes?

A functional comparison of the corporate tax systems of different
jurisdictions must be grounded in the conviction that the corporate tax
systems of the compared jurisdictions essentially fulfill the same
function. One of the shortcomings of the current discourse is that
many participants simply assume this to be the case. This assumption
could, at the least, be revisited.
The question of the justification of imposition of tax on corporate
entities is a controversial one. Several justifications are given for the
213
imposition of corporate tax. The first and most common one views
214
the corporation as a proxy to the taxation of its shareholders. The
argument is that, “[w]ithout a corporate tax, high income individuals
could channel funds into corporations, and, with a large part of

213

A full-blown discussion of the question “why we tax corporations?” is well
beyond the scope of this article. I heavily draw here on Avi-Yonah’s Corporations,
Society, and the State¸ if only as a convenient source where some of the justifications
for taxing corporations are summarized. See Reuven Avi-Yonah, Corporations,
Society, and the State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193 (2004).
214
Id. at 1201.
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earnings retained, obtain lower tax rates than if they operated in
partnership or proprietorship form or in a way that allowed them to
215
be taxed as such.” In addition, it is administratively easier to collect
tax in a centralized manner from one entity rather than from multiple
216
shareholders.
I refer to this functional justification as the
“collection” justification.
The second justification is that the operation in a corporate form
confers certain benefits to shareholders (such as limited liability) and
217
corporate tax is a fee paid in return for such benefits. I refer to this
justification as the “fee” justification.
Third, corporate taxes may be justified as a mechanism of
corporate governance in public corporations. Under this argument,
“corporate tax is necessary because otherwise the agency-cost
problem will be exacerbated when management (which may or may
not include shareholders) faces a different tax rate for corporate
218
actions than those of some shareholders.” I refer to this justification
as the “governance” justification.
The fourth justification for the imposition of corporate taxation is
that it “is justified as a means to control the excessive accumulation of
power in the hands of corporate management, which is inconsistent
219
with a properly functioning liberal democratic polity.” I refer to this
argument as the “democratic” argument.
While none of the justifications to the imposition of corporate
taxes mentioned above is without controversy, clearly, corporate tax is
a legal model that may serve multiple purposes in responding to
various needs. When participants in the discourse are comparing
corporate tax systems around the world and argue that the U.S.
system should be more “in line with the rest of the world,” they
implicitly assume that corporate taxes in all jurisdictions compared
fulfill, at least to a certain extent, the same functions. Such an
assumption is a perilous simplification of reality.
For example, the various roles of corporate taxation as a
collection mechanism may be a result of strictly local context. One
fascinating example of a comparative study showing exactly that is
Steven Bank’s study in which he explored why the United States and

215

CRS 2007 REPORT, supra note 103, at 4.
Avi-Yonah, supra note 213, at 1201–02.
217
Id. at 1205–06.
218
Id. at 1208 (citing Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, Taxes, Agency Costs, and
the Price of Incorporation, 77 VA. L. REV. 211, 229–31 (1991)).
219
Avi-Yonah, supra note 213, at 1244.
216
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the United Kingdom diverge in their approaches to corporate220
shareholder integration. The U.S. system is a “quasi-classical”
system, which means it imposes tax at both the entity level and the
shareholder level (albeit at reduced rates in the latter case, hence,
quasi-classical). The United Kingdom, on the other hand, historically
used some sort of imputation system that levied taxes at the corporate
level but gave shareholders credit on the allocable part of such tax on
the receipt of corporate distributions. Bank’s study aimed to unveil
how “the U.S. and [the] U.K.—two countries with similarly developed
economies and corporate cultures—diverge in their approach[] to
221
corporate income taxation.”
Based on a detailed historical survey, Bank argues that U.K.
corporations regularly distribute profits to shareholders. In the United
States, however, at the turn of the twentieth century, U.S.
corporations started to retain profits. This, in essence, was the result
of different market dynamics in both jurisdictions. This divergence of
policies crafted different roles for the corporate tax systems. In the
United Kingdom, where profits are regularly distributed, the view that
corporate tax is a proxy for the taxation of shareholders made sense.
The collection at the corporate level is nothing more than a
withholding-at-source regime rather than a substantive tax. But in the
United States, the phenomenon of earnings retention at the corporate
level distorted the system of progressive taxation. With no actual
distributions to shareholders, Congress could no longer count on
corporate tax as a system of withholding. The imposition of an
increased “real” tax at the corporate level was the necessary response
to revenue needs and the implementation of redistribution policy.
Note that Bank poses his question perfectly in a functional stance,
comparing jurisdictions with similarly developed economies and
corporate cultures. Yet, his study looks at differences rather than
similarities of such comparable jurisdictions, which is why it so
relevant to tax reform discourse. It shows that similar jurisdictions
may face different local problems.
To turn to the governance argument, if we believe that the
“resilience of the corporate tax is a manifestation of the most
enduring source of problems in corporate law, the separation between
222
ownership and control of large corporations,”
then we must

220

Steven A. Bank, The Dividend Divide in Anglo-American Corporate Taxation,
30 J. CORP. L. 1, 1 (2004).
221
Id. at 2–3.
222
Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate
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question whether this “most enduring problem” is similarly
experienced across jurisdictions. Corporate governance problems are
different across jurisdictions depending, for one, on market structures.
In concentrated markets, agency issues show themselves as conflicts
between majority and minority shareholders, while, in dispersed
markets, the conflicts arise between managers and public
shareholders. If corporate taxation operates as a governance
mechanism, it probably needs to address different governance issues,
depending on the market in which it operates. The U.S. system of
corporate taxation operates in a dispersed market. Yet, it is frequently
compared with the systems of other OECD countries, many of which
223
have concentrated markets.
If corporate taxation is a “fee” for limited liability, such a fee is
much more broadly collected – for example – in France and Japan,
where every business entity that provides limited liability to its owner
is subject to corporate tax (including limited liability partnerships),
than in the United States, which effectively collects corporate tax from
only publicly traded corporations. Arguably, corporate taxation fulfills
a function in France and Japan that is not present in the United
States.
Finally, if we accept that corporate taxation in the United States is
an instrument to alleviate the concentration of power in the hands of
the few, it makes no comparative sense to compare such a system with
systems of jurisdictions in which concentration of power is not
224
necessarily perceived to be a problem.
2.

Compartmentalization

I already noted that participants in the discourse who advocate
rate reduction and the adoption of a territorial system frequently cite
the U.K. corporate tax reform as a recent example that we should
follow. However, corporate tax rate reductions and the adoption of a
dividend exemption system are not the only meaningful changes
Taxation, 105 Yale L.J. 325, 327 (1995).
223
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate
Ownership Around the World, 54 J. Fin 471, 472 (1999).
224
The competitiveness of the corporate tax system in the United States is
sometimes compared with the systems of jurisdictions in such places as China, the
Arab Emirates, and Venezuela. While I have not researched the issue myself, I
suspect that, if we look into the role of corporate tax systems in these jurisdictions
compared to those in the United States, functional dis-equivalences will surface. I
doubt that in such jurisdictions power is heavily concentrated in entities in which the
central government does not have influence (at least as a practical matter).
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recently introduced to the U.K. tax code.
After a temporary VAT rate reduction to 15%, which took place
in 2008, the United Kingdom reinstated its 15.5% VAT rate in 2010.
Following the 2010 Emergency Budget, the VAT rate has been
further increased to 20% as of 2011. The U.K. corporate tax rate
reduction combined with the move toward territoriality had to be
financed. The financial crisis of 2008 certainly did not help the
constrained budget, and, with an increasing deficit, VAT was called on
to save the day. As Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne,
remarked, “[o]nce we had decided that at least part of dealing with
the deficit had to come from a tax rise, it struck us that VAT was the
225
least damaging tax rise.” Interestingly, some participants in the
discourse who advocate rate reduction and territoriality in the name
of competitiveness point to the United Kingdom as an example
supportive of their arguments. Sometimes, the same commentators
also strongly oppose VAT but neglect to make the obvious connection
between the VAT increase in the United Kingdom, and the corporate
226
income tax rate cuts.
Another example of piecemeal comparison concerns the 2008
German reform. Advocates of rate reduction frequently cite
Germany’s reform due to its significant ten percentage points of
statutory rate reduction. Again, it is frequently ignored that the 2008
rate reduction had to be financed. To start with, as in to the United
Kingdom, VAT rates were increased (by three percentage points).
Much more interesting, however, are the measures that Germany took
to expand its now lightly taxed corporate tax base. The basebroadening provisions adopted in the 2008 reform are truly
staggering.
To start with, Germany significantly limited the ability of
corporations to take depreciation deductions, repealing the decliningbalance depreciation method, which allowed corporations to expense

225

Kitty Donaldson & Thomas Penny, Osborne Defends Britain’s VAT Increase
as Opponents See Damage to Economy, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 4, 2011, 10:21 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-04/osborne-defends-vat-increase-to-20-asopponents-warn-of-damage-to-growth.html.
226
See, e.g., Ways and Means July 26 Hearing, supra note 141 (testimony of
Daniel J. Mitchell, Senior Fellow, Cato Institute) (opposing VAT). The Cato
Institute, citing comparative studies, supports reduction of corporate tax rates. See
Chris Edwards, Tax and Budget Bulletin No. 28: Catching Up to Global Tax Reforms,
CATO INST. (Nov. 2005), http://www.cato.org/pubs/tbb/tbb-0511-28.pdf (citing multiple
reforms taken by other countries reducing the corporate tax rates, without
mentioning whether such countries have a VAT system in place).
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capital investments over a shorter period than the useful life of the
assets. After the reform, generally, only the straight-line method of
depreciation is allowed, significantly limiting the ability of German
corporations to expense their investments. Second, the Germanunique trade tax, which is imposed in Germany in significant rates on
business income, used to be deductible for income tax purposes. This
is no longer the case after the 2008 reform. To put this change in a
functionally equivalent context, a similar measure in the United States
would be, for example, the disallowance of deduction of state taxes for
purposes of computing the federal income tax liability. Third,
Germany introduced rules similar to those prescribed under Section
382 of the Code in the United States, significantly limiting the ability
to utilize net operating losses of corporations in case of control
transfers. Fourth, and the most significant, is the introduction of the
“interest barrier rule.” This last feature deserves further elaboration.
Prior to the 2008 reform, interest payments by a corporation on a
loan made by a related party would be allowed as a deduction only to
the extent that the debt-to-equity ratio of a corporation’s capital
structure did not exceed 1.5:1. This is, in very general terms, similar to
the interest deduction limitation currently imposed under section
163(j) of the Code. This rule has been replaced with an interest barrier
rule under which “interest expense incurred by the German parent in
Germany is fully deductible only if the German parent on a
standalone basis is no more than immaterially more highly leveraged
227
than are its non-German operations.” This, in effect, eliminates the
ability of German corporations to strip their German earnings by way
of excessive leverage.
While proponents of rate reduction coupled with base expansion
are numerous, only seldom do they actually compare anything other
than rates. The German reform is sometimes mentioned in terms of
base broadening but usually only in the context of the thin
capitalization rules, and these are only generally discussed (Kleinbard
being one notable exception). These measures put to question
whether the German reform achieved competitiveness at all, and they
certainly introduce further complexity into the German system.
German commentators complain that “[t]he nominal reduction of the
German business tax rate has been achieved at the expense of
fundamental policy values, practical considerations and the consensus
228
of the tax community.” One German commentator even called for

227
228

Kleinbard, supra note 134, at 141.
Wright, supra note 201, at 319.
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the repeal of the base-broadening measures even if the price is an
229
increase in the corporate tax rates.
The most acute example, in my view, of comparative functional
negligence in choice of models for comparison, comes up in the case
of the Japanese tax reform. Following the adoption of the territorial
system of dividend exemption, Japan also revised its CFC legislation.
Under the new CFC rules, a Japanese resident who owns ten percent
or more of the equity of a controlled subsidiary resident in a foreign
jurisdiction is immediately taxed on all undistributed profits of such
subsidiary if the foreign jurisdiction imposes tax at an effective rate of
230
less than twenty percent. Compared to the CFC rules in the United
States, which only taxes passive income of foreign subsidiaries of U.S.
MNCs, the Japanese rules are draconian.
As observed from studies of the 2004 repatriation holiday
discussed above, much of the earnings repatriated to the United States
under the temporary relief came from tax havens, providing anecdotal
evidence that many (if not most) unrepatriated earnings of U.S.
MNCs are “parked” in jurisdictions where the tax rates are less than
twenty percent. In other words, from a comparative perspective, to
cite Japan as an example for justifying the move to territoriality is
functionally questionable, without noting its CFC regime. If the
United States were to adopt such a regime, almost all currently
231
unrepatriated earnings of U.S. MNCs would be immediately taxed.
This new Japanese regime of taxation of foreign earnings is so
comprehensive, such that it “is not necessarily a radical departure
from the worldwide income taxation of resident corporations. . . .
Japan will continue to tax the worldwide income of resident
corporations, only selectively exempting certain dividends distributed
232
from foreign subsidiaries.” Just as the United States has an ersatz
territorial system, seemingly, Japan has an ersatz worldwide system.
These examples show that compartmentalized analysis distorts
the functional comparative picture. The tendency of participants in
the discourse to disengage the micro from the macro, such as in the
case of VAT increases to finance the move to territoriality in the
229

Homburg, supra note 202, at 610.
A narrow exception applies where the Japanese CFC has real presence and
business in the foreign jurisdiction. For a description of such rules, see STAFF OF JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, BACKGROUND AND SELECTED ISSUES RELATED TO THE U.S.
INTERNATIONAL TAX SYSTEM AND SYSTEMS THAT EXEMPT FOREIGN BUSINESS
INCOME, JCX-33-11, at 21–22 (2011).
231
Kleinbard, supra note 134, at 146.
232
Masui, supra note 183, at 247.
230
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United Kingdom, and to disconnect parts of the corporate tax system
as if they are unrelated areas of law, such as in the case of territoriality
and the CFC regime in Japan or the case of corporate tax rate
decreases and interest deduction limitation in Germany, simply
creates a false picture of the reforms that took place elsewhere. The
arguments that we should adopt territoriality because Japan and the
United Kingdom did or reduce rates because Germany and the
United Kingdom did are only possible because many participants in
the discourse use a breadth of comparison that is frequently too
narrow, which is primarily a failure in the execution of functional
analysis.
3.

Abstractness and Generalization

Another shortcoming of the comparative process as executed by
many participants of the discourse is that they generalize corporate
tax models into unworkable abstracts.
The basic feature of such abstraction is the frequent reference to
corporate tax systems in the United States and elsewhere as some
holistic models with defined boundaries and obvious functionality or
as “whole” models of taxation that subject identical taxpayers to the
same taxes in the same manner. This implicit assumption many times
underlies the argument that the U.S. corporate tax “system” is less
competitive than the corporate tax “systems” of other jurisdictions.
This is a poor depiction of the effect of corporate taxes in real life.
Corporate taxes operate differently in different jurisdictions but, more
importantly, within each jurisdiction. Not all corporate entities in the
United States suffer the same burden of corporate taxes. Participants,
particularly when relying on studies in comparative public finance,
refer to the business community as a bloc. However, “[w]e have big
businesses, small business, we have manufacturing businesses that are
quite different from service entities. They all have different tax
233
structures, and they all have different tax problems.”
Different industry sectors face completely different corporate tax
burdens. Wal-Mart, a retail chain that operates in the United States
and thus must locate its stores, distribution facilities, and employees in
the United States (because this is where the customers are), has very
little room to maneuver in terms of income shifting. It therefore pays
233

Corporate Tax Reform: Is it In the Air?: Tax Analysts Conference Proceedings,
TAX ANALYSTS (Mar. 25, 2011), http://www.taxanalysts.com/www/conferences.nsf/
KeyLookup/GBRO-8E4M6P?OpenDocument&link=transcript (statement of Martin
Regalia, Senior Vice President, Econ. and Tax Policy, U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
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In other
effective rates very close to the actual statutory rates.
industries, factors such as the use of depreciable property and the
value of intangibles (that can be magically shifted elsewhere with a
push of a button) play an important role. Industries’ tax burdens are
affected, among other reasons, by the types of assets they use and
235
their operating structures.
For 2010, the U.S. retail industry carried an average effective tax
236
burden of almost 26%. The pharmaceutical industry, on the other
hand, carried a burden of a mere 6.72%. The ETR for the private
equity sector, where business entities are usually formed as
partnerships, was 0.43%(!). The argument is clear: when we say that
the U.S. corporate tax system is uncompetitive, we must ask, “for
whom?” Obviously, any comparison would have to ask a similar
question with respect to the compared jurisdictions. Not all industries
in each country suffer the same burden of corporate tax, which may be
the result of the comparative advantage of specific industries in
specific jurisdictions or simply a reflection of local preference for a
specific industry. Simply comparing “companies” misses the mark.
This leads to another point regarding the incidence of corporate
tax rates. As mentioned above, many commentators note that
corporations do not pay taxes, people do. A further assertion is that
labor carries most of the burden. If this assertion is correct, an
employee of the retail industry probably carries a much higher burden
than an employee in a pharmaceutical company. If a comparison is
made to support the easing of such burdens, it should question which
employees in the foreign jurisdiction carry what burden in order to
make the comparison convincing. Also important to note in this
respect is a fact that participants in the discourse frequently cite: most
of the labor force in the United States is employed by non-corporate
entities. Under this logic, the benefit of corporate tax rate reductions
234

The CEO of Wal-Mart, Mike Duke, eloquently exemplified those differences
in recent testimony before the Finance Committee: “Last year in the U.S., Walmart
paid $1.25 billion in state and local property tax. We paid $630 million in state
corporate income tax. We collected and remitted $13.8 billion in sales tax. And we
paid $4.7 billion in corporate taxes in the U.S., which was about 3% of all corporate
income taxes that were collected by the U.S. Treasury. Our effective corporate tax
rate last year was 32.2%. Many companies that testify before you theoretically face
similar tax rates; we actually pay them.” Finance July 27 Hearing, supra note 51, at 1.
235
CRS 2007 REPORT, supra note 103, at 21.
236
Professor Aswath Damodaran from NYU Stern School of Business reports
the effective tax rates of different U.S. industries at the end of each year. His recent
report is available at: Aswath Damodaran, Tax Policy, MUSINGS ON MARKETS (Jan.
28, 2011), http://aswathdamodaran.blogspot.com/2011/01/tax-policy.html.
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abroad may have been shared by much of the labor force. However,
rate reduction here (to the extent it affects wages) will profit a rather
narrow sector of employees — those employed by publicly traded
companies (because, under the logic of the corporate tax incidence
argument, non-corporate employees will remain unaffected).
In addition, the argument that corporations do not pay taxes,
people do, even though true, stands in sharp contrast to another
argument sometimes made in the context of current debate: countries
237
do not compete, companies do. Business entities are abstract legal
creations and, as such, are not interested in the rate of return of an
investment. Their equity owners and managers are. In other words, I
assert the companies do not compete; people do. But participants,
when discussing competition, many times stop at comparing corporate
taxes and completely neglect the comparison of individual income
taxes and the way they integrate with corporate-level taxes. This is
wrong because the boundaries of competitiveness obviously do not
correlate to the boundaries of corporate taxes if individuals are the
ones paying the taxes and are the ones competing for investment
returns. I did not explore the issue of corporate-shareholder
integration in this article, and this is indeed an important issue. In the
current discourse, however, most participants do not address this issue
comparatively, a fact that seriously cripples any comparative
competitiveness argument.
Finally, it is not necessarily clear that countries do not compete.
Countries may compete implicitly and explicitly. It is not
unreasonable to expect that countries will reform their tax systems to
improve the status of their own industries well beyond global
238
neutrality and thus implicitly compete with other countries.
Moreover, in today’s global markets, it is hard to ignore the explicit
role played by national governments. Some of the largest equity
investors in the world are sovereign wealth funds owned and operated
by national governments. The assets under management in such funds
are in fact “larger than the total assets under management in hedge

237

Gravelle, supra note 52, at 474.
The argument that countries do not compete rests on an assumption that the
perfect international tax system is based on a norm that maximizes “global, rather
than national welfare.” However, “[a]s a guide to national policy, such global altruism
may be morally admirable, but it is more than we might really expect. Nations, no less
than individuals, typically act, at least within broad limits, to advance their own
interests rather than those of everyone in the world.” Daniel Shaviro, The Rising TaxElectivity of U.S. Corporate Residence, 64 TAX L. REV. 377, 386–87 (2011).
238
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funds or private equity funds.” So, when we say competition and
compare competitors, the possibility of real national-government-level
competition must be taken into account. In the current discourse, this
issue is simply ignored.
E. The Technique of Comparison:

1.

How Corporate Tax Models Operate

Comparison itself is an in-depth look into how law really
operates, which is another place where participants in the discourse
frequently fail. I discuss only two major examples that underlie the
very basics of the competitiveness argument.
What almost all participants compare (with a few notable
exceptions, most obvious being Knoll) is the corporate taxes countries
impose on their domestic MNCs. When doing so, participants in the
discourse ignore significant factional differences in how different
jurisdictions define what a “corporation” is and what “domestic”
means for tax purposes.
“A basic structural decision in the design of corporate tax is the
determination of which entities or organizations should be subject to
240
the tax.” Unfortunately, participants in the discourse largely ignore
this basic issue. This is a meaningful failure because the United States
is probably the only country in the world that allows most of its
business entities to effectively elect whether to be taxed as a
corporation or not. As noted above, under the “check-the-box”
regulations, a business entity, whether domestic or foreign, is not
taxed at the entity level unless it is specifically referenced in the
regulations as an entity that is to be treated as a per-se corporation, or
otherwise elects to be taxed as a corporation. The effect of the
regulations is that in the United States practically only publicly traded
corporations are subject to entity-level tax. As noted above, however,
most business income in the United States is earned by
unincorporated business and hence not subject to entity-level taxes.

239

Foreign Government Investment in the U.S. Economy And Financial Sector:
Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic and Int’l Monetary Policy, Trade,
and Tech. & the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., and Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the
H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 8 (2008) (statement of David H. McCormick,
Under Secretary for International Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury).
240
HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 339 (3d ed. 2010).
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The situation in many (if not most) other industrialized
241
jurisdictions is completely different. While an owner of a limited
liability company (LLC) in the United States can have it treated as
fiscally transparent for tax purposes, in Germany, the functional
equivalent of an LLC (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, or
GmbH) is subject to corporate taxes. In France, not only the
equivalent of an LLC (Société à Responsabilité Limitée, or S.à.R.L.) is
subject to corporate taxes but also any profits of the French
equivalent of a limited liability partnership, or LLP (Société en
Commandite Simple), that are attributable to the holdings of any
limited partners. The same is true for Japan, where, simply put, a
Japanese LLP (Goshi Kaisha) is subject to corporate taxes. Unlike in
the United States, the price that an investor in frequently compared-to
jurisdictions has to pay for limited liability is corporate tax.
When the United States does not subject to corporate taxes
entities that are functionally equivalent to entities that are subject to
corporate taxes in many other countries, the comparison of corporate
tax rates and corporate tax burdens becomes nothing more than a
crude juxtaposition of words in texts of different tax codes (the words
being “corporate taxes”). For example, of all the different indicators
of corporate tax burden, corporate-tax-cut proponents disrespect the
most the one that measures the share of corporate tax revenue in
proportion to GDP. However, the corporate tax collection to GDP
ratio is the only measurement that takes the entity classification
difference into account. When this ratio is measured in France, the
“revenue collection” numerator includes corporate taxes collected
from LLPs and LLCs, which is not the case in the United States. This
means that the argument that revenue collection in the United States
is poor compared to other countries due to the uncompetitive tax
environment in the United States is, at the least, questionable. It is at
least as conceivable that revenue collection compares poorly to other
jurisdictions because such jurisdictions collect revenue from business
entities that the United States does not. In the current version of the
debate, the competitiveness argument does not stretch beyond the
competitiveness of U.S. publicly traded MNCs.
Knoll’s analysis of competition is so important because he is
almost the only commentator who analyzes competitiveness based on
business segments (or, in his words, “industries”) rather than by
comparing “corporations.” When industries are compared, the tax

241

AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 240, at 339–342; AVI-YONAH, SARTORI &
MARIAN, supra note 11, at 114–30.
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burden would take into account the way in which the industry
operates, including whether it is subject to industry-level taxes. For
example, we could logically assume that the private equity industry in
the United States is far more competitive (tax-wise) than the Japanese
one since a private equity fund in Japan would be subject to entitylevel tax, while in the United States it would not.
A second example of the technical failure of the comparison is
that commentators almost always fail to define what a domestic
corporation is, which is important to do because participants in the
discourse pose the competition argument as being a dichotomy,
differentiating between U.S. corporations and non-U.S. corporations.
The competition is between “our” corporations and “theirs.” How we
define our corporations and how they define theirs is significant.
Interestingly, critical analysis of comparative law provides a useful
insight here, as it puts in doubt such dichotomies as an operating
assumption.
Here as well, the United States stands in sharp contrast to many
other jurisdictions. Section 7701(a)(4) of the Code defines a
corporation as “domestic” formalistically, by reference to the place of
incorporation. The place of incorporation, however, says nothing
about who the owners or the managers of the corporations are. Thus,
a corporation incorporated in Delaware wholly owned by a French
individual would be a U.S. corporation for federal income tax
purposes. On the other hand, a corporation in the Cayman Islands
wholly owned by a U.S. individual would be treated as a foreign
corporation for federal income tax purposes.
Most other jurisdictions employ some version of a more
substantive rule for corporate residency, known as the “place of
effective management” (POEM). The OECD defines the place of
effective management as “the place where key management and
commercial decisions that are necessary for the conduct of the entity’s
242
business as a whole are in substance made.”
Obviously, such a difference may be of great significance when
considering who is competing against whom. A German-controlled
corporation incorporated in the United States will be defined as a
German corporation (under the POEM test) for German tax purposes
but as a U.S. corporation for U.S. tax purposes (under the place of
incorporation test). In this case, “ours” is also “theirs.” On the other
hand, a corporation that is wholly owned by U.K. shareholders,
242

OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Model Tax Convention on Income and
on Capital: Condensed Version, at 77 (July 17, 2008).
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incorporated in the Cayman Islands but managed by an American
CEO, is effectively “residentless.” It is not resident in the United
Kingdom because it is managed from the United States. It is not
domiciled in the United States because it is incorporated in the
Cayman Islands. It is not taxed in the Cayman Islands because, well,
the Cayman Islands simply does not impose tax on foreign-owned
corporations. In other words, in competitive terms, for tax purposes,
this corporation is neither “ours” nor “theirs.” Such corporations are
simply nonexistent for purposes of the competitiveness argument.
Given that U.S. investors frequently facilitate foreign investments
by using offshore corporations, the result is that corporations that are
owned, managed by and create financial benefits to U.S. residents are
excluded from the discourse. If we accept my assertion that
individuals, not corporations, compete, such corporations must be
considered functionally “ours” when we discuss international
competition.
To summarize this part, ignorance of how corporate tax law
actually works here and elsewhere produces comparative results with
unclear value. If “corporate” here and “corporate” elsewhere mean
different things for tax purposes, the comparison is essentially one of
apples and oranges.
2.

Methodological and Ideological Disengagement

Another failure of participants in the discourse in the execution of
comparisons is incoherency. It seems that participants tend to use
comparisons when convenient and dismiss comparisons when they are
not. Participants also frequently employ methods of comparison
inconsistently, rejecting them and adopting them carelessly, shifting
randomly from one form of analysis to another.
For example, many participants in the discourse who advocate
rate reductions to improve competitiveness (a) point to rate
reductions widely adopted elsewhere and (b) dismiss as inappropriate
the measurement of tax burden by the collection-to-GDP ratio (which
usually implies that the United States is not uncompetitive). However,
the same participants many times reject the adoption of VAT (a) even
though it is widely adopted elsewhere and (b) use the collection-toGDP ratio method (the same method that they sometimes dismiss) to
explain why VAT is such a bad idea.
The other side of the aisle is also at fault. Proponents of
worldwide consolidation usually reject territoriality although it is
widely adopted; taking a difference-oriented approach to comparison,
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they note many unique differences between the United States and
countries that adopted territoriality. On the other hand, many of the
same participants are also advocating VAT, supporting their
arguments by pointing to the similarity of models adopted elsewhere,
frequently ignoring contextual differences, such as the VAT base and
VAT preferences in each jurisdiction.
This incoherence is a result of misunderstanding of what
comparison is. Instead of using the comparison to coherently promote
a defined agenda, participants simply seek jurisdictions that adopted
models they wish to adopt and point to such jurisdictions in support of
their argument. Unfortunately, the same jurisdictions may also have
adopted other models that such commentators do not wish to adopt.
This forces them to take an incoherent approach, adopting
comparisons when convenient, ignoring them when they are not.
This practice presents a limited view of legal comparison as a tool
for legal reform. The fact that something is “there” is of little
meaning. Yet, this can easily be fixed by harnessing comparison to
promote a specific agenda. Participants in the discourse, I believe,
wrongly view comparison as some objective picture of reality.
However, comparison is hardly free of political agendas, and clear
agendas may make comparison more coherent. For example, when
objections to VAT are made because VAT creates bigger
government, it makes perfect sense to argue against its adoption if we
take this ideological view even though it is adopted elsewhere
(assuming we believe the comparative studies according to which
VAT really increases the size of governments). The same ideological
position would also support territoriality and rate cuts, particularly
because it is adopted elsewhere (because we need to remain
competitive). Similarly, an argument according to which only rich
publicly traded corporations would benefit from rate cuts (unlike in
other jurisdictions) would go ideologically hand in hand with a
comparative argument according to which we should not adopt rate
cuts coupled with territoriality (even though adopted elsewhere) but
should adopt VAT (like in other countries). In such cases,
comparative arguments that approve some models adopted elsewhere
but reject others are rational because they support a coherent
ideological view.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article observed how the vibrant debate in corporate tax
reform in the United States is dominated by comparative arguments.
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This is generally a welcome phenomenon. Tax writers have much to
learn from the experience of other taxing jurisdictions. However, as
much as a comparative approach is desirable, it is also dangerous if ill
executed. Bad comparisons produce inaccurate guidance that may not
bring about the desired results of tax reform.
Most participants simply juxtapose laws. To start, they do not
define the purposes of comparison well. The result is comparative
arguments that are sometimes based on comparisons with jurisdictions
that actually failed to achieve the same competitiveness and simplicity
aims that we seek to achieve. Participants also fail to properly
consider which jurisdictions are appropriate candidates for
comparison, and the result is comparative research that includes
jurisdictions that are simply irrelevant for competitiveness arguments.
Participants also fail to properly define the legal models compared,
falling into the trap of ultra-specificity, on the one hand, and
overgeneralization on the other. Finally, they fail to observe how
corporate tax laws actually operate in real life in the jurisdictions
compared. This raises the question of what relevant guidance can be
produced, when the compared models are treated as similar even
though they are very different.
Several themes that emerge may hint to the underlying
circumstances of such failures. First, and the most important one, is
the utter disregard of any coherent process of comparison.
Comparisons are made in an almost random manner rather than as a
rigorous methodical endeavor. Second, there is an overreliance on
comparative finance to make legal arguments. While comparative
finance may prove helpful, it must rely on some real understanding of
the functionality of tax rules. It is questionable whether this is the case
in the context of tax reform discourse. Third, participants disengage
the process of comparison from any identified ideological stance. To
be sure, the ideological positions of participants in the discourse are
usually well defined. However, comparison is wrongly perceived to be
an objective endeavor. This creates an eclectic, uncommitted,
sometimes contradictory approach to comparisons, shifting from
functional to cultural analysis almost unconsciously.
Within the context of the corporate tax reform debate, the
comparative process is currently harnessed by participants of the
discourse to explain why their ideologies and beliefs are superior. This
undermines the benefits of the comparative process by forcing it into
an intractable political disagreement. Instead, participants should
acknowledge their ideological agenda, and harness comparison to
support the formulation of policies that efficiently execute such
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agenda. Comparative tax law holds much promise for the process of
corporate tax reform in the United States. To fulfill this promise,
participants in the corporate tax reform discourse must take a more
engaged and serious view of comparative tax law and the process of
comparison.
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